X-Git-Url: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=gnupg.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=g10%2Fmainproc.c;h=50d1d2713ad8ae275affd3c319769593ccaf08cf;hp=dc7988987e9cb734639066ba7aa64158b7dc3f0b;hb=1b8decc4767f0c55867327bdf3113204efcd19a7;hpb=0173cd5a9810622e38b76123528e83024fb59a0c
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index dc7988987..50d1d2713 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
/* mainproc.c - handle packets
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
- * 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,
+ * 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Werner Koch
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
* GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
@@ -15,9 +16,7 @@
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
- * USA.
+ * along with this program; if not, see .
*/
#include
@@ -28,11 +27,10 @@
#include
#include "gpg.h"
+#include "util.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "options.h"
-#include "util.h"
-#include "cipher.h"
#include "keydb.h"
#include "filter.h"
#include "main.h"
@@ -44,6 +42,11 @@
#include "pka.h"
+/* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
+ value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
+#define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
+
+
struct kidlist_item {
struct kidlist_item *next;
u32 kid[2];
@@ -58,32 +61,59 @@ struct kidlist_item {
typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
struct mainproc_context
{
+ ctrl_t ctrl;
struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
- PKT_secret_key *last_seckey;
PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
md_filter_context_t mfx;
int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
- strlist_t signed_data;
+
+ /* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
+ detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
+ file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
const char *sigfilename;
+
+ /* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
+ signature. */
+ struct
+ {
+ /* A file descriptor of the the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
+ int data_fd;
+ /* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
+ used if DATA_FD is -1. */
+ strlist_t data_names;
+ /* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
+ is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
+ int used;
+ } signed_data;
+
DEK *dek;
int last_was_session_key;
KBNODE list; /* The current list of packets. */
- int have_data;
IOBUF iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
ulong symkeys;
struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
- int any_sig_seen; /* Set to true if a signature packet has been seen. */
+ struct {
+ unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
+ has been seen. */
+ unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
+ unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
+ } any;
};
static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a );
-
static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node );
static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node );
+static int literals_seen;
+void
+reset_literals_seen(void)
+{
+ literals_seen=0;
+}
static void
release_list( CTX c )
@@ -99,7 +129,8 @@ release_list( CTX c )
}
c->pkenc_list = NULL;
c->list = NULL;
- c->have_data = 0;
+ c->any.data = 0;
+ c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
}
@@ -126,7 +157,7 @@ add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* New clear text signature.
* Process the last one and reset everything */
release_list(c);
- }
+ }
if( c->list ) /* add another packet */
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
@@ -177,7 +208,7 @@ add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
KBNODE node;
- c->any_sig_seen = 1;
+ c->any.sig_seen = 1;
if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) {
/* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
* GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
@@ -212,7 +243,7 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
}
- if (gcry_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
+ if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
BUG ();
if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
BUG ();
@@ -229,18 +260,12 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
BUG ();
- /* This is not completely accurate, since a bad passphrase may have
- resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since
- a bogus byte here will fail later. */
- if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
- idea_cipher_warn(0);
-
memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
/*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
return 0;
-}
+}
static void
proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
@@ -253,9 +278,9 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
else if(!c->dek)
{
int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
- const char *s = gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo);
+ const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
- if(s)
+ if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
{
if(!opt.quiet)
{
@@ -290,7 +315,7 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
else
{
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0,
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3,
NULL, NULL);
if(c->dek)
{
@@ -340,7 +365,13 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[50];
- sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
+ /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo
+ number to the Libgcrypt definef one. This is due a
+ chicken-egg problem: We need to have code in libgcrypt for
+ a new algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm
+ before the IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP
+ indentifier. */
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
(ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo );
write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
}
@@ -356,13 +387,22 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
}
else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
- || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
- || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) {
- /* FIXME: strore this all in a list and process it later */
-
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
+ || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)
+ || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL) {
+ /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
+ There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
+ subkey. */
+
+ /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
+ we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
+ experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
|| opt.try_all_secrets
- || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
+ || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)) ) {
if( opt.list_only )
result = -1;
else {
@@ -411,13 +451,13 @@ print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
PKT_public_key *pk;
const char *algstr;
-
+
if ( failed && !list->reason )
continue;
if ( !failed && list->reason )
continue;
- algstr = gcry_pk_algo_name ( list->pubkey_algo );
+ algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( list->pubkey_algo );
pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
if( !algstr )
@@ -442,14 +482,17 @@ print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
if( is_status_enabled() ) {
char buf[20];
- sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
- (ulong)list->kid[1] );
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
+ (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
}
}
else if (list->reason)
+ {
log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
g10_errstr(list->reason));
+ write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
+ }
}
}
@@ -497,16 +540,15 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if ( algo )
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
- gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo));
- else if ( gcry_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+ else if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
{
algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
if (!algo)
algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
- idea_cipher_warn(1);
log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
"optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
- gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo));
+ openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
}
else
{
@@ -521,15 +563,16 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
}
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, NULL );
if (c->dek)
c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
- if( !result )
- result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
+
+ if (!result)
+ result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
if( result == -1 )
;
@@ -542,23 +585,22 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
- if(opt.show_session_key)
- {
- int i;
- char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
- sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
- for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
- sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
- log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf );
- write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
- }
}
else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
}
else {
+ if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
+ && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
+ {
+ log_debug(_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"),
+ c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
+ passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
+ }
+ glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
@@ -578,8 +620,10 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc;
KBNODE n;
+ literals_seen++;
+
if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) )
- log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
+ log_info(_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
else if( opt.verbose )
log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
@@ -621,7 +665,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
if ( datalen < 2 )
- log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
+ log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
/* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
* documents */
clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
@@ -650,7 +694,8 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
}
- if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
+ if (opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify
+ && opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos) {
/* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only
* catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored
* pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
@@ -660,17 +705,34 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
BUG ();
}
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
- gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+ gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
- gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+ gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
- rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
- if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only )
+ rc=0;
+
+ if (literals_seen>1)
{
- /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
- signature. */
- rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+ log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
+
+ if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
+ log_inc_errorcount ();
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(!rc)
+ {
+ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
+ if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only )
+ {
+ /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
+ signature. */
+ rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+ }
}
if( rc )
@@ -684,7 +746,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
if (c->list)
add_kbnode (c->list, n);
- else
+ else
c->list = n;
}
@@ -692,35 +754,54 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
static int
proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
{
- return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data,
- ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
+ if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
+ && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+ ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
+ else
+ return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
+ ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
+ ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
}
static int
-proc_encrypt_cb( IOBUF a, void *info )
+proc_encrypt_cb (IOBUF a, void *info )
{
- return proc_encryption_packets( info, a );
+ CTX c = info;
+ return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
}
-static void
+static int
proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
- PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
- int rc;
+ PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
+ if (c->sigs_only)
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
+ else if( c->encrypt_only )
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
+ else
+ rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
+ {
+ if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
+ {
+ CTX cc;
- /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
- if( !zd->algorithm )
- rc=G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
- else if( c->sigs_only )
- rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c );
- else if( c->encrypt_only )
- rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c );
- else
- rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
- if( rc )
- log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
- free_packet(pkt);
- c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
+ cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
+ log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ }
+ }
+ else if (rc)
+ log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+
+ free_packet(pkt);
+ c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+ return rc;
}
/****************
@@ -781,7 +862,7 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
|| sig->sig_class == 0x1f
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x28
- || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) {
if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
|| c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
@@ -825,12 +906,12 @@ print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
else
- print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
}
else
- print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
+ print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
}
@@ -841,272 +922,214 @@ print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
static void
list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
- int any=0;
- int mainkey;
+ int mainkey;
+ char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
- if( !node )
- ;
- else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) )
- || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
- PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ if (!node)
+ ;
+ else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY))
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+ {
+ PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
- if( opt.with_colons )
- {
- u32 keyid[2];
- keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
- if( mainkey )
- c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
- 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
- printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
- if( c->trustletter )
- putchar( c->trustletter );
- printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
- nbits_from_pk( pk ),
- pk->pubkey_algo,
- (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
- colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
- colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
- if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
- putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
- putchar(':');
- if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
- putchar('\n'); any=1;
- if( opt.fingerprint )
- print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
- printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
- node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
- }
- }
- else
- printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s%s",
- mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
- pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ),
- datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":"");
-
- if( mainkey ) {
- /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
- for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
- if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
- if( !any ) {
- if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
- puts("[revoked]");
- else
- putchar('\n');
- any = 1;
- }
- list_node(c, node );
- }
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( any ) {
- if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("%s:::::::::",
- node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
- else
- printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
- }
- print_userid( node->pkt );
- if( opt.with_colons )
- putchar(':');
- putchar('\n');
- if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
- print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
- if( opt.with_colons
- && node->next
- && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
- printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
- node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
- node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
- }
- any=1;
- }
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
- if( !any ) {
- putchar('\n');
- any = 1;
- }
- list_node(c, node );
- }
- }
- }
- else
- {
- /* of subkey */
- if( pk->is_revoked )
- {
- printf(" [");
- printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
- printf("]");
- }
- else if( pk->expiredate )
- {
- printf(" [");
- printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
- printf("]");
- }
- }
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
+
+ keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+ if (mainkey)
+ c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
+ 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL));
+ es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
+ if (c->trustletter)
+ es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
+ es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+ nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+ pk->pubkey_algo,
+ (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+ colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+ colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+ if (mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode)
+ es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ }
+ else
+ es_printf ("%s %s/%s %s",
+ mainkey? "pub":"sub",
+ pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
+ keystr_from_pk (pk),
+ datestr_from_pk (pk));
+
+ if (pk->flags.revoked)
+ {
+ es_printf (" [");
+ es_printf (_("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
+ es_printf ("]\n");
+ }
+ else if( pk->expiredate && !opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ es_printf (" [");
+ es_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
+ es_printf ("]\n");
+ }
+ else
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
- if( !any )
- putchar('\n');
- if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
- print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
- }
- else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
- || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
- PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+ if ((mainkey && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
+ print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);
- if( opt.with_colons )
- {
- u32 keyid[2];
- keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
- printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
- mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
- nbits_from_sk( sk ),
- sk->pubkey_algo,
- (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
- colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
- colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
- /* fixme: add LID */ );
- }
- else
- printf("%s %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
- nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
- keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk ));
- if( mainkey ) {
- /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
- for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
- if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
- if( !any ) {
- if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
- puts("[revoked]");
- else
- putchar('\n');
- any = 1;
- }
- list_node(c, node );
- }
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( any ) {
- if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("%s:::::::::",
- node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
- else
- printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
- }
- print_userid( node->pkt );
- if( opt.with_colons )
- putchar(':');
- putchar('\n');
- if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
- print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
- any=1;
- }
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
- if( !any ) {
- putchar('\n');
- any = 1;
- }
- list_node(c, node );
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ if (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
+ es_printf ("rtv:1:%u:\n",
+ node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval);
+ }
+
+ if (mainkey)
+ {
+ /* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
+ for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
+ {
+ if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ list_node (c, node );
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+ {
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
+ node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
+ else
+ es_printf ("uid%*s", 28, "" );
+ print_userid (node->pkt);
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
+ if (opt.with_colons
+ && node->next
+ && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
+ {
+ es_printf ("rtv:2:%u:\n",
+ node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
+ node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
+ }
}
- }
- }
- if( !any )
- putchar('\n');
- if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
- print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
+ {
+ list_node(c, node );
+ }
+ }
+ }
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
- PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
- int is_selfsig = 0;
- int rc2=0;
- size_t n;
- char *p;
- int sigrc = ' ';
+ else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
+ {
- if( !opt.verbose )
- return;
+ log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
+ /* fixme: We may use a fucntion to turn a secret key packet into
+ a public key one and use that here. */
+ }
+ else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+ int is_selfsig = 0;
+ int rc2 = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ char *p;
+ int sigrc = ' ';
+
+ if (!opt.verbose)
+ return;
- if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
- fputs("rev", stdout);
- else
- fputs("sig", stdout);
- if( opt.check_sigs ) {
- fflush(stdout);
- rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL );
- switch (gpg_err_code (rc2)) {
- case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
- case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
- case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
- case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
- default: sigrc = '%'; break;
+ if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
+ es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
+ else
+ es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
+ if (opt.check_sigs)
+ {
+ fflush (stdout);
+ rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL);
+ switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
+ {
+ case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
+ case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
+ case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
+ case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
+ default: sigrc = '%'; break;
}
}
- else { /* check whether this is a self signature */
- u32 keyid[2];
+ else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
+ {
+ u32 keyid[2];
- if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
- || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
- if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
- keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid );
- else
- keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid );
+ if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+ || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+ {
+ keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
- if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] )
- is_selfsig = 1;
- }
+ if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
+ is_selfsig = 1;
+ }
}
- if( opt.with_colons ) {
- putchar(':');
- if( sigrc != ' ' )
- putchar(sigrc);
- printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
- (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
- colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
- colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
-
- if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
- printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
- printf(":");
-
- if(sig->trust_regexp)
- print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
- strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
- printf(":");
+
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ {
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ if (sigrc != ' ')
+ es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
+ es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+ colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
+ colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
+
+ if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+ es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+
+ if (sig->trust_regexp)
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
+ strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
}
- else
- printf("%c %s %s ",
- sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
- if( sigrc == '%' )
- printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
- else if( sigrc == '?' )
- ;
- else if( is_selfsig ) {
- if( opt.with_colons )
- putchar(':');
- fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout);
- if( opt.with_colons )
- putchar(':');
+ else
+ es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
+ sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
+ if (sigrc == '%')
+ es_printf ("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
+ else if (sigrc == '?')
+ ;
+ else if (is_selfsig)
+ {
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
+ es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_putc (':', es_stdout);
}
- else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
- p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
- print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
- xfree(p);
+ else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
+ {
+ p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
+ es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
+ opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
+ xfree (p);
}
- if( opt.with_colons )
- printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
- putchar('\n');
+ if (opt.with_colons)
+ es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
+ es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
}
- else
- log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
+ else
+ log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
}
int
-proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
int rc;
CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
xfree( c );
@@ -1116,15 +1139,20 @@ proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
int
-proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
+proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a,
strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
{
CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->sigs_only = 1;
- c->signed_data = signedfiles;
+
+ c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
+ c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
+ c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
+
c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
@@ -1132,8 +1160,8 @@ proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
- with an error. */
- if (!rc && !c->any_sig_seen)
+ with an error. */
+ if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
{
write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
@@ -1143,19 +1171,64 @@ proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
/* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on
success so that we won't issue the nodata status several
times. */
- if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any_sig_seen)
- c->anchor->any_sig_seen = 1;
+ if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+ c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
xfree( c );
return rc;
}
+
+int
+proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
+ void *anchor, IOBUF a, int signed_data_fd )
+{
+ int rc;
+ CTX c;
+
+ c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
+ if (!c)
+ return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
+ c->anchor = anchor;
+ c->sigs_only = 1;
+
+ c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
+ c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
+ c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
+
+ rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );
+
+ /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
+ messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
+ Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
+ error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
+ with an error. */
+ if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
+ {
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
+ log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
+ }
+
+ /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
+ so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
+ if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
+ c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
+
+ xfree ( c );
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
int
-proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
+proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a )
{
CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
int rc;
+ c->ctrl = ctrl;
c->anchor = anchor;
c->encrypt_only = 1;
rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
@@ -1164,14 +1237,37 @@ proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
}
-int
+static int
+check_nesting (CTX c)
+{
+ int level;
+
+ for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
+ level++;
+
+ if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
+ {
+ log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
+ write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
+ return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
{
- PACKET *pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
- int rc=0;
- int any_data=0;
+ PACKET *pkt;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int any_data = 0;
int newpkt;
+ rc = check_nesting (c);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
c->iobuf = a;
init_packet(pkt);
while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) {
@@ -1192,7 +1288,7 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
@@ -1210,7 +1306,7 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
goto leave;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
@@ -1230,7 +1326,7 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
@@ -1255,23 +1351,27 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
+ case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
default: newpkt = 0; break;
}
}
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto leave;
+
/* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
* I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
* The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
* packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
* when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
* an extra layer.
- * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
+ * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
*/
if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
- c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
+ c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
if( newpkt == -1 )
;
@@ -1365,12 +1465,45 @@ pka_uri_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
}
+static void
+print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
+ PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+ un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+ un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
+ -1);
+
+ if (un)
+ p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+ else
+ p = xstrdup ("[?]");
+
+ if (rc)
+ log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
+ else if (sig->flags.expired)
+ log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
+ else
+ log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
+
+ xfree (p);
+}
+
+
static int
-check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
+check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node)
{
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
const char *astr;
- int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
+ int rc;
+ int is_expkey = 0;
+ int is_revkey = 0;
+ char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
+
+ *pkstrbuf = 0;
if (opt.skip_verify)
{
@@ -1387,7 +1520,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
-
+
O = One-Pass Signature packet.
S = Signature packet.
P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
@@ -1399,7 +1532,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
We reject all other messages.
-
+
Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
introduce a bug here.
@@ -1413,7 +1546,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
n = c->list;
assert (n);
- if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+ if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
{
/* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
"S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
@@ -1432,7 +1565,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
else
goto ambiguous;
}
- else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
+ else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
{
/* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
@@ -1447,8 +1580,17 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
n_sig++;
if (!n_sig)
goto ambiguous;
- if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
- goto ambiguous;
+
+ /* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
+ something like this:
+
+ if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
+ goto ambiguous;
+
+ However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
+ can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
+ messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
+
if (n_onepass != n_sig)
{
log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
@@ -1471,394 +1613,383 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if (n || !n_sig)
goto ambiguous;
}
- else
+ else
{
ambiguous:
log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
return 0;
}
-
}
- /* (Indendation below not yet changed to GNU style.) */
+ astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
+ if (keystrlen () > 8)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+ log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
+ astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
+ }
+ else
+ log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+ asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+ keystr(sig->keyid));
- astr = gcry_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
- if(keystrlen()>8)
- {
- log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
- log_info(_(" using %s key %s\n"),
- astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
- }
- else
- log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
- asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
- keystr(sig->keyid));
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
- rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+ /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
- /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+ {
+ const byte *p;
+ int seq = 0;
+ size_t n;
- if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
- {
- const byte *p;
- int seq=0;
- size_t n;
+ while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+ {
+ /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
+ you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
+ "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
+ even try to make two strings here :) */
+ log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+ print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
+ log_printf ("\n");
+
+ if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+ && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
+ {
+ struct keyserver_spec *spec;
- while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
- {
- /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
- grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
- page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm
- not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
- log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
- print_utf8_string( log_get_stream(), p, n );
- log_printf ("\n");
-
- if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
- && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
- {
- struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+ spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
+ if (spec)
+ {
+ int res;
- spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
- if(spec)
- {
- int res;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec);
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+ free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+
+ if (!rc)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
- res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec);
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
- if(!res)
- rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
- free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+ /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
+ try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
+ {
+ const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
- if(!rc)
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
+ if (uri)
+ {
+ /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+ fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+ int res;
+ struct keyserver_spec *spec;
- /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
- try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
- if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY
- && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
- && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD)
- {
- const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
-
- if (uri)
- {
- /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
- fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
- int res;
- struct keyserver_spec *spec;
-
- spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
- if (spec)
- {
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
- res = keyserver_import_keyid (sig->keyid, spec);
+ spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1, NULL, 0);
+ if (spec)
+ {
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec);
glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
free_keyserver_spec (spec);
if (!res)
- rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
- }
- }
- }
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+ }
+ }
+ }
- /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
+ /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
- if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver
- && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
- {
- int res;
-
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
- res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
- glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
- if(!res)
- rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
- }
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY
+ && opt.keyserver
+ && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
+ {
+ int res;
- if( !rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ) {
- KBNODE un, keyblock;
- int count=0, statno;
- char keyid_str[50];
- PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
-
- if(rc)
- statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
- else if(sig->flags.expired)
- statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
- else if(is_expkey)
- statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
- else if(is_revkey)
- statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
- else
- statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+ res=keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
+ glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+ if (!res)
+ rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+ }
- keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
+ if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+ {
+ kbnode_t un, keyblock;
+ int count = 0;
+ int statno;
+ char keyid_str[50];
+ PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+
+ if (rc)
+ statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
+ else if (sig->flags.expired)
+ statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
+ else if (is_expkey)
+ statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+ else if(is_revkey)
+ statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+ else
+ statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
+
+ keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (sig->keyid);
+
+ snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+
+ /* Find and print the primary user ID. */
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ int valid;
- sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
- (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+ {
+ pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ continue;
+ if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
+ continue;
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+ continue;
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+ continue;
+ if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
+ continue;
+ /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ continue;
- /* find and print the primary user ID */
- for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
- char *p;
- int valid;
- if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
- {
- pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
- continue;
- }
- if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
- continue;
- if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
- continue;
- if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
- continue;
- if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
- continue;
- if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
- continue;
- /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
- if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
- continue;
+ assert (pk);
- assert(pk);
+ /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting the
+ output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" line. */
+ valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
- /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
- the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
- line. */
- valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+ keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
- keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
- write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,
- -1 );
-
- p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
-
- if(rc)
- log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
- else if(sig->flags.expired)
- log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
- else
- log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+ print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
- xfree(p);
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+ log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+ else
+ log_printf ("\n");
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
- log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
- else
- log_printf ("\n");
- count++;
+ pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
+ count++;
}
- if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual
- userid */
- char *p;
- /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
- for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
- if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
- !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
- break;
+ if (!count) /* Just in case that we have no valid textual userid */
+ {
+ /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+ && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ break;
}
- /* Try for any userid at all */
- if(!un) {
- for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
- if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
- break;
+ /* Try for any userid at all */
+ if (!un)
+ {
+ for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
+ break;
}
}
- if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
- keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+ if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+ keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
- write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
- un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
- un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
- -1 );
+ print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
- if(un)
- p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
- else
- p=xstrdup("[?]");
-
- if(rc)
- log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
- else if(sig->flags.expired)
- log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
- else
- log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
- if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
- log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
- log_printf ("\n");
+ if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
+ log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
+ log_printf ("\n");
}
- /* If we have a good signature and already printed
- * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
- if ( count && !rc ) {
- char *p;
- for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
- if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
- continue;
- if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
- || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
- && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
- continue;
- /* Only skip textual primaries */
- if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
- !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
- continue;
-
- if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
- {
- dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
+ /* If we have a good signature and already printed
+ * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+ if (count
+ && !rc
+ && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
+ {
+ char *p;
+ for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+ {
+ if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
+ continue;
+ if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+ || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+ && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+ continue;
+ /* Only skip textual primaries */
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
+ && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+ continue;
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
- show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
- }
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+ {
+ dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);
- p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
- log_info(_(" aka \"%s\""),p);
- xfree(p);
+ if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+ show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+ pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+ }
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
- {
- const char *valid;
- if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
- valid=_("revoked");
- else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
- valid=_("expired");
- else
- valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
- un->pkt->
- pkt.user_id));
- log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
- }
- else
- log_printf ("\n");
+ p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
+ log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
+ xfree (p);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
+ {
+ const char *valid;
+
+ if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+ valid = _("revoked");
+ else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+ valid = _("expired");
+ else
+ valid = (trust_value_to_string
+ (get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id)));
+ log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
+ }
+ else
+ log_printf ("\n");
}
}
- release_kbnode( keyblock );
-
- if( !rc )
- {
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)
- show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
- else
- show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)
- show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
- else
- show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
+ show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
+ else
+ show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
+ show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
+ else
+ show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
+
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
+ show_notation
+ (sig, 0, 1,
+ (((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
+ + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
+ else
+ show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
+ }
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS)
- show_notation(sig,0,1,
- ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
- ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
- else
- show_notation(sig,0,2,0);
- }
+ if (!rc && is_status_enabled ())
+ {
+ /* Print a status response with the fingerprint. */
+ PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
- if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
- /* print a status response with the fingerprint */
- PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
-
- if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
- byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
- char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
- size_t i, n;
-
- bufp = buf;
- fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
- p = array;
- for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
- sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
- /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
- with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
- etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to
- match! */
- sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
- strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
- (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
- sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
- sig->sig_class);
- bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
- if (!vpk->is_primary) {
- u32 akid[2];
-
- akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
- akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
- free_public_key (vpk);
- vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
- if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
- /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
- n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
- memset (array, 0, n);
- }
- else
- fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+ if (!get_pubkey (vpk, sig->keyid))
+ {
+ byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+ char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
+ size_t i, n;
+
+ bufp = buf;
+ fingerprint_from_pk (vpk, array, &n);
+ p = array;
+ for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+ sprintf (bufp, "%02X", *p );
+ /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
+ with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
+ etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to match! */
+ sprintf (bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
+ strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
+ (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
+ sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
+ sig->sig_class);
+ bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
+ if (!vpk->flags.primary)
+ {
+ u32 akid[2];
+
+ akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
+ akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
+ free_public_key (vpk);
+ vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
+ if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid))
+ {
+ /* Impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
+ n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
+ memset (array, 0, n);
+ }
+ else
+ fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
}
- p = array;
- for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
- sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
- write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
+ p = array;
+ for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+ sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+ write_status_text (STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf);
}
- free_public_key( vpk );
+ free_public_key (vpk);
}
- if (!rc)
- {
- if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS)
- pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
- rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
- }
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
+ pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
+ rc = check_signatures_trust (sig);
+ }
- if(sig->flags.expired)
- {
- log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
- asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
- rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
- }
- else if(sig->expiredate)
- log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
-
- if(opt.verbose)
- log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
- sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
- sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
- gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo));
-
- if( rc )
- g10_errors_seen = 1;
- if( opt.batch && rc )
- g10_exit(1);
+ if (sig->flags.expired)
+ {
+ log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+ rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
+ }
+ else if (sig->expiredate)
+ log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+ if (opt.verbose)
+ log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
+ sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+ sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+ gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
+ *pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"",
+ pkstrbuf);
+
+ if (rc)
+ g10_errors_seen = 1;
+ if (opt.batch && rc)
+ g10_exit (1);
}
- else {
- char buf[50];
- sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
- (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
- sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
- sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
- write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
- if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
- buf[16] = 0;
- write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
+ else
+ {
+ char buf[50];
+
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
+ (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+ sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
+ sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc);
+ write_status_text (STATUS_ERRSIG, buf);
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
+ {
+ buf[16] = 0;
+ write_status_text (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf);
}
- if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
- log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
+ if (gpg_err_code (rc) != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
+ log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc));
}
- return rc;
+
+ return rc;
}
@@ -1898,7 +2029,9 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
/* check all signatures */
- if( !c->have_data ) {
+ if( !c->any.data ) {
+ int use_textmode = 0;
+
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
/* prepare to create all requested message digests */
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
@@ -1911,23 +2044,33 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
}
- /* ask for file and hash it */
+
+ if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ use_textmode = 1;
+
+ /* Ask for file and hash it. */
if( c->sigs_only ) {
- rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL,
- c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
- n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ use_textmode);
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ use_textmode );
}
else {
- rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
- n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
+ use_textmode );
}
if( rc ) {
log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
return;
}
}
- else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+ else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
@@ -1939,15 +2082,15 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
== CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
/* clear text signed message */
- if( !c->have_data ) {
+ if( !c->any.data ) {
log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
return;
}
- else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+ else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}
-
+
for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
}
@@ -1981,7 +2124,7 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
sig->sig_class);
- else if( !c->have_data ) {
+ else if( !c->any.data ) {
/* detached signature */
free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0))
@@ -1990,7 +2133,8 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
;
else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
- && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
+ && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo)
+ && opt.flags.allow_weak_digest_algos) {
/* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0))
BUG ();
@@ -2003,25 +2147,32 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0 ))
BUG ();
}
-#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
- /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
- * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
- * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
- * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should
- * then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly
- * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
- */
- /* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
-#endif
+
+ /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
+ * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
+ * signatures; this would let the first signature check
+ * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
+ * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
+ * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
+ * some cases (and break others).
+ * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
+ */
+
if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
- gcry_md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+ gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
if ( c->mfx.md2 )
- gcry_md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+ gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
}
if( c->sigs_only ) {
- rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
- c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
- (sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
+ if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
+ rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_fd,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
+ else
+ rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
+ c->signed_data.data_names,
+ c->sigfilename,
+ (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
}
else {
rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
@@ -2033,7 +2184,7 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
return;
}
}
- else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+ else if ( c->signed_data.used ) {
log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
return;
}