* keyring.c: Make some strings translatable.
[gnupg.git] / g10 / pkclist.c
index 480b175..da07639 100644 (file)
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@
 /* pkclist.c
- *     Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003,
+ *               2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
- * This file is part of GNUPG.
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
- * GNUPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
  * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
  * (at your option) any later version.
  *
- * GNUPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  * GNU General Public License for more details.
 #include "keydb.h"
 #include "memory.h"
 #include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
 #include "trustdb.h"
 #include "ttyio.h"
 #include "status.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 
-
 #define CONTROL_D ('D' - 'A' + 1)
 
-
+/****************
+ * Show the revocation reason as it is stored with the given signature
+ */
 static void
-show_paths( ulong lid, int only_first )
+do_show_revocation_reason( PKT_signature *sig )
 {
-    void *context = NULL;
-    unsigned otrust, validity;
-    int last_level, level;
-
-    last_level = 0;
-    while( (level=enum_cert_paths( &context, &lid, &otrust, &validity)) != -1){
-       char *p;
-       int rc;
-       size_t n;
-       u32 keyid[2];
-       PKT_public_key *pk ;
-
-       if( level < last_level && only_first )
-           break;
-       last_level = level;
-
-       rc = keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid );
-       if( rc ) {
-           log_error("ooops: can't get keyid for lid %lu\n", lid);
-           return;
-       }
-
-       pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-       rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-       if( rc ) {
-           log_error("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n",
-                                   (ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
-           return;
-       }
-
-       tty_printf("%*s%4u%c/%08lX.%lu %s \"",
-                 level*2, "",
-                 nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-                 (ulong)keyid[1], lid, datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-       p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-       tty_print_string( p, n ),
-       m_free(p);
-       tty_printf("\"\n");
-       free_public_key( pk );
+    size_t n, nn;
+    const byte *p, *pp;
+    int seq = 0;
+    const char *text;
+
+    while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON,
+                                &n, &seq, NULL )) ) {
+       if( !n )
+           continue; /* invalid - just skip it */
+
+       if( *p == 0 )
+           text = _("No reason specified");
+       else if( *p == 0x01 )
+           text = _("Key is superseded");
+       else if( *p == 0x02 )
+           text = _("Key has been compromised");
+       else if( *p == 0x03 )
+           text = _("Key is no longer used");
+       else if( *p == 0x20 )
+           text = _("User ID is no longer valid");
+       else
+           text = NULL;
+
+       log_info( _("reason for revocation: ") );
+       if( text )
+           fputs( text, log_stream() );
+       else
+           fprintf( log_stream(), "code=%02x", *p );
+       putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+       n--; p++;
+       pp = NULL;
+       do {
+           /* We don't want any empty lines, so skip them */
+           while( n && *p == '\n' ) {
+               p++;
+               n--;
+           }
+           if( n ) {
+               pp = memchr( p, '\n', n );
+               nn = pp? pp - p : n;
+               log_info( _("revocation comment: ") );
+               print_string( log_stream(), p, nn, 0 );
+               putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+               p += nn; n -= nn;
+           }
+       } while( pp );
     }
-    enum_cert_paths( &context, NULL, NULL, NULL ); /* release context */
-    tty_printf("\n");
 }
 
+/* Mode 0: try and find the revocation based on the pk (i.e. check
+   subkeys, etc.)  Mode 1: use only the revocation on the main pk */
 
-
-
-/****************
- * Returns true if an ownertrust has changed.
- */
-int
-edit_ownertrust( ulong lid, int mode )
+void
+show_revocation_reason( PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
 {
-    char *p;
+    /* Hmmm, this is not so easy becuase we have to duplicate the code
+     * used in the trustbd to calculate the keyflags.  We need to find
+     * a clean way to check revocation certificates on keys and
+     * signatures.  And there should be no duplicate code.  Because we
+     * enter this function only when the trustdb told us that we have
+     * a revoked key, we could simply look for a revocation cert and
+     * display this one, when there is only one. Let's try to do this
+     * until we have a better solution.  */
+    KBNODE node, keyblock = NULL;
+    byte fingerprint[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+    size_t fingerlen;
     int rc;
-    size_t n;
-    u32 keyid[2];
-    PKT_public_key *pk ;
-    int changed=0;
 
-    rc = keyid_from_lid( lid, keyid );
-    if( rc ) {
-       log_error("ooops: can't get keyid for lid %lu\n", lid);
-       return 0;
+    /* get the keyblock */
+    fingerprint_from_pk( pk, fingerprint, &fingerlen );
+    rc = get_keyblock_byfprint( &keyblock, fingerprint, fingerlen );
+    if( rc ) { /* that should never happen */
+       log_debug( "failed to get the keyblock\n");
+       return;
     }
 
-    pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-    rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
-    if( rc ) {
-       log_error("key %08lX: public key not found: %s\n",
-                               (ulong)keyid[1], g10_errstr(rc) );
-       return 0;
+    for( node=keyblock; node; node = node->next ) {
+        if( (mode && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ||
+         ( ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+           && !cmp_public_keys( node->pkt->pkt.public_key, pk ) ) )
+           break;
     }
-
-    if( !mode ) {
-       tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to %lu:\n"
-                  "%4u%c/%08lX %s \""), lid,
-                 nbits_from_pk( pk ), pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-                 (ulong)keyid[1], datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-       p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
-       tty_print_string( p, n ),
-       m_free(p);
-       tty_printf("\"\n\n");
+    if( !node ) {
+       log_debug("Oops, PK not in keyblock\n");
+       release_kbnode( keyblock );
+       return;
     }
-    tty_printf(_(
-"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n"
-"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n"
-"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n"
-" 1 = Don't know\n"
-" 2 = I do NOT trust\n"
-" 3 = I trust marginally\n"
-" 4 = I trust fully\n"
-" s = please show me more information\n") );
-    if( mode )
-       tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n"));
-    tty_printf("\n");
-
-    for(;;) {
-       /* a string with valid answers */
-       char *ans = _("sSmM");
-
-       if( strlen(ans) != 4 )
-           BUG();
-       p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
-       trim_spaces(p);
-       cpr_kill_prompt();
-       if( *p && p[1] )
-           ;
-       else if( !p[1] && (*p >= '1' && *p <= '4') ) {
-           unsigned trust;
-           switch( *p ) {
-             case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
-             case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER    ; break;
-             case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
-             case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY    ; break;
-             default: BUG();
-           }
-           if( !update_ownertrust( lid, trust ) )
-               changed++;
+    /* now find the revocation certificate */
+    for( node = node->next; node ; node = node->next ) {
+       if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
            break;
+       if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+           && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
+               || node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 ) ) {
+               /* FIXME: we should check the signature here */
+               do_show_revocation_reason ( node->pkt->pkt.signature );
+               break;
        }
-       else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] ) {
-           tty_printf(_(
-               "Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
-           show_paths( lid, 1  );
-       }
-       else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) ) {
-           break ; /* back to the menu */
-       }
-       m_free(p); p = NULL;
     }
-    m_free(p);
-    m_free(pk);
-    return changed;
+
+    /* We didn't find it, so check if the whole key is revoked */
+    if(!node && !mode)
+      show_revocation_reason(pk,1);
+
+    release_kbnode( keyblock );
 }
 
 
 /****************
- * Try to add some more owner trusts (interactive)
- * Returns: -1 if no ownertrust were added.
+ * mode: 0 = standard
+ *       1 = Without key info and additional menu option 'm'
+ *           this does also add an option to set the key to ultimately trusted.
+ * Returns: 
+ *      -2 = nothing changed - caller should show some additional info
+ *      -1 = quit operation
+ *       0 = nothing changed
+ *       1 = new ownertrust now in new_trust
  */
 static int
-add_ownertrust( PKT_public_key *pk )
+do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode,
+                    unsigned *new_trust, int defer_help )
 {
-    int rc;
-    void *context = NULL;
-    ulong lid;
-    unsigned otrust, validity;
-    int any=0, changed=0, any_undefined=0;
-
-    tty_printf(
-_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key.  Let's see whether we\n"
-  "can assign some missing owner trust values.\n\n"));
-
-    rc = query_trust_record( pk );
-    if( rc ) {
-       log_error("Ooops: not in trustdb\n");
-       return -1;
+  char *p;
+  u32 keyid[2];
+  int changed=0;
+  int quit=0;
+  int show=0;
+  int min_num;
+  int did_help=defer_help;
+  unsigned int minimum=get_min_ownertrust(pk);
+
+  switch(minimum)
+    {
+    default:              min_num=0; break;
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED: min_num=1; break;
+    case TRUST_NEVER:     min_num=2; break;
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:  min_num=3; break;
+    case TRUST_FULLY:     min_num=4; break;
     }
 
-    lid = pk->local_id;
-    while( enum_cert_paths( &context, &lid, &otrust, &validity ) != -1 ) {
-       any=1;
-       if( otrust == TRUST_UNDEFINED || otrust == TRUST_EXPIRED ||
-           otrust == TRUST_UNKNOWN ) {
-           any_undefined=1;
-           if( edit_ownertrust( lid, 0 ) )
-               changed=1;
-       }
-    }
-    enum_cert_paths( &context, NULL, NULL, NULL ); /* release context */
-
-    if( !any )
-       tty_printf(_("No path leading to one of our keys found.\n\n") );
-    else if( !any_undefined )
-       tty_printf(_("No certificates with undefined trust found.\n\n") );
-    else if( !changed )
-       tty_printf(_("No trust values changed.\n\n") );
+  keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
+  for(;;) {
+    /* A string with valid answers.
+
+       Note to translators: These are the allowed answers in lower and
+       uppercase.  Below you will find the matching strings which
+       should be translated accordingly and the letter changed to
+       match the one in the answer string.
+    
+         i = please show me more information
+         m = back to the main menu
+         s = skip this key
+        q = quit
+    */
+    const char *ans = _("iImMqQsS");
+
+    if( !did_help ) 
+      {
+        if( !mode ) 
+          {
+            KBNODE keyblock, un;
+
+            tty_printf(_("No trust value assigned to:\n"));
+           tty_printf("%4u%c/%s %s\n",nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+                      pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
+                       keystr(keyid), datestr_from_pk( pk ) );
+           p=get_user_id_native(keyid);
+           tty_printf(_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+           m_free(p);
+
+            keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
+            if (!keyblock)
+                BUG ();
+            for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
+             {
+                if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+                 continue;
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
+                 continue;
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
+                 continue;
+               /* Only skip textual primaries */
+                if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
+                   && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                 continue;
+                
+               if((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+                  && un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+                 show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+                             un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+
+               p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+
+               tty_printf(_("  aka \"%s\"\n"),p);
+             }
+        
+            print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
+            tty_printf("\n");
+           release_kbnode (keyblock);
+          }
+
+       if(opt.trust_model==TM_DIRECT)
+         {
+           tty_printf(_("How much do you trust that this key actually "
+                        "belongs to the named user?\n"));
+           tty_printf("\n");
+         }
+       else
+         {
+           /* This string also used in keyedit.c:trustsig_prompt */
+           tty_printf(_("Please decide how far you trust this user to"
+                        " correctly verify other users' keys\n"
+                        "(by looking at passports, checking fingerprints from"
+                        " different sources, etc.)\n"));
+           tty_printf("\n");
+         }
+
+       if(min_num<=1)
+         tty_printf (_("  %d = I don't know or won't say\n"), 1);
+       if(min_num<=2)
+         tty_printf (_("  %d = I do NOT trust\n"), 2);
+       if(min_num<=3)
+         tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust marginally\n"), 3);
+       if(min_num<=4)
+         tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust fully\n"), 4);
+        if (mode)
+          tty_printf (_("  %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5);
+#if 0
+       /* not yet implemented */
+        tty_printf ("  i = please show me more information\n");
+#endif
+        if( mode )
+          tty_printf(_("  m = back to the main menu\n"));
+        else
+         {
+           tty_printf(_("  s = skip this key\n"));
+           tty_printf(_("  q = quit\n"));
+         }
+        tty_printf("\n");
+       if(minimum)
+         tty_printf(_("The minimum trust level for this key is: %s\n\n"),
+                    trust_value_to_string(minimum));
+        did_help = 1;
+      }
+    if( strlen(ans) != 8 )
+      BUG();
+    p = cpr_get("edit_ownertrust.value",_("Your decision? "));
+    trim_spaces(p);
+    cpr_kill_prompt();
+    if( !*p )
+      did_help = 0;
+    else if( *p && p[1] )
+      ;
+    else if( !p[1] && ((*p >= '0'+min_num) && *p <= (mode?'5':'4')) ) 
+      {
+        unsigned int trust;
+        switch( *p )
+          {
+          case '1': trust = TRUST_UNDEFINED; break;
+          case '2': trust = TRUST_NEVER    ; break;
+          case '3': trust = TRUST_MARGINAL ; break;
+          case '4': trust = TRUST_FULLY    ; break;
+          case '5': trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE ; break;
+          default: BUG();
+          }
+        if (trust == TRUST_ULTIMATE
+            && !cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("edit_ownertrust.set_ultimate.okay",
+                                       _("Do you really want to set this key"
+                                         " to ultimate trust? (y/N) ")))
+          ; /* no */
+        else
+          {
+            *new_trust = trust;
+            changed = 1;
+            break;
+          }
+      }
+#if 0
+    /* not yet implemented */
+    else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] ) 
+      {
+        tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n"));
+        show = 1;
+        break;
+      }
+#endif
+    else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) ) 
+      {
+        break ; /* back to the menu */
+      }
+    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[6] || *p == ans[7] ) )
+      {
+       break; /* skip */
+      }
+    else if( !mode && (*p == ans[4] || *p == ans[5] ) )
+      {
+        quit = 1;
+        break ; /* back to the menu */
+      }
+    m_free(p); p = NULL;
+  }
+  m_free(p);
+  return show? -2: quit? -1 : changed;
+}
 
-    return any? 0:-1;
+/* 
+ * Display a menu to change the ownertrust of the key PK (which should
+ * be a primary key).  
+ * For mode values see do_edit_ownertrust ()
+ */
+int
+edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode )
+{
+  unsigned int trust;
+  int no_help = 0;
+
+  for(;;)
+    {
+      switch ( do_edit_ownertrust (pk, mode, &trust, no_help ) )
+        {
+        case -1: /* quit */
+          return -1;
+        case -2: /* show info */
+          no_help = 1;
+          break;
+        case 1: /* trust value set */
+          trust &= ~TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+          trust |= get_ownertrust (pk) & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED;
+          update_ownertrust (pk, trust );
+          return 1;
+        default:
+          return 0;
+        }
+    }
 }
 
+
 /****************
  * Check whether we can trust this pk which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL
  * Returns: true if we trust.
  */
 static int
-do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
+do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
 {
-    int rc;
-
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
-       log_info(_("key %08lX: key has been revoked!\n"),
-                                       (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-       if( opt.batch )
-           return 0;
-
-       if( !cpr_get_answer_is_yes("revoked_key.override",
-                                   _("Use this key anyway? ")) )
-           return 0;
+  /* We should not be able to get here with a revoked or expired
+     key */
+  if(trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED
+     || trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED
+     || (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) == TRUST_EXPIRED)
+    BUG();
+
+  if( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
+    {
+      if( opt.verbose )
+       log_info("No trust check due to `--trust-model always' option\n");
+      return 1;
     }
 
-
-    switch( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
-      case TRUST_UNKNOWN: /* No pubkey in trustDB: Insert and check again */
-       rc = insert_trust_record( pk );
-       if( rc ) {
-           log_error("failed to insert it into the trustdb: %s\n",
-                                                     g10_errstr(rc) );
-           return 0; /* no */
-       }
-       rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-       if( rc )
-           log_fatal("trust check after insert failed: %s\n",
-                                                     g10_errstr(rc) );
-       if( trustlevel == TRUST_UNKNOWN || trustlevel == TRUST_EXPIRED )
-           BUG();
-       return do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
-
-      case TRUST_EXPIRED:
-       log_info(_("%08lX: key has expired\n"),
-                                   (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-       return 0; /* no */
-
-      case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
-       if( opt.batch || opt.answer_no )
-           log_info(_("%08lX: no info to calculate a trust probability\n"),
-                                       (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-       else {
-           rc = add_ownertrust( pk );
-           if( !rc ) {
-               rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-               if( rc )
-                   log_fatal("trust check after add_ownertrust failed: %s\n",
-                                                             g10_errstr(rc) );
-               /* fixme: this is recursive; we should unroll it */
-               return do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
-           }
-       }
-       return 0;
-
-      case TRUST_NEVER:
-       log_info(_("%08lX: We do NOT trust this key\n"),
-                                       (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-       return 0; /* no */
-
-      case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-       log_info(
-       _("%08lX: It is not sure that this key really belongs to the owner\n"
-        "but it is accepted anyway\n"), (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL) );
-       return 1; /* yes */
-
-      case TRUST_FULLY:
-       if( opt.verbose )
-           log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the owner\n"));
-       return 1; /* yes */
-
-      case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
-       if( opt.verbose )
-           log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
-       return 1; /* yes */
-
-      default: BUG();
+  switch(trustlevel & TRUST_MASK)
+    {
+    default:
+      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
+                trustlevel);
+      /* fall thru */
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
+      log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
+                " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+      return 0; /* no */
+
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
+      log_info(_("%s: There is limited assurance this key belongs"
+                " to the named user\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
+      return 1; /* yes */
+
+    case TRUST_FULLY:
+      if( opt.verbose )
+       log_info(_("This key probably belongs to the named user\n"));
+      return 1; /* yes */
+
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
+      if( opt.verbose )
+       log_info(_("This key belongs to us\n"));
+      return 1; /* yes */
     }
 
-
-    /* Eventuell fragen falls der trustlevel nicht ausreichend ist */
-
-
-    return 1; /* yes */
+  return 1; /* yes */
 }
 
 
@@ -321,27 +444,36 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
  * key anyway.
  */
 static int
-do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
+do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
 {
-    int rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
+  int rc;
 
-    if( !opt.batch && !rc ) {
-       tty_printf(_(
-"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n"
-"If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n"
-"the next question with yes\n\n") );
+  rc = do_we_trust( pk, trustlevel );
 
-       if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
-                                 _("Use this key anyway? "))  )
-           rc = 1;
-    }
-    else if( opt.always_trust && !rc ) {
-       log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
+  if( !opt.batch && !rc )
+    {
+      print_pubkey_info(NULL,pk);
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 2);
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      tty_printf(
+              _("It is NOT certain that the key belongs to the person named\n"
+                "in the user ID.  If you *really* know what you are doing,\n"
+                "you may answer the next question with yes.\n"));
+
+      tty_printf("\n");
+
+      if( cpr_get_answer_is_yes("untrusted_key.override",
+                               _("Use this key anyway? (y/N) "))  )
        rc = 1;
+
+      /* Hmmm: Should we set a flag to tell the user about
+       *        his decision the next time he encrypts for this recipient?
+       */
     }
-    return rc;
-}
 
+  return rc;
+}
 
 
 /****************
@@ -351,103 +483,110 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_key *pk, int trustlevel )
 int
 check_signatures_trust( PKT_signature *sig )
 {
-    PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-    int trustlevel;
-    int dont_try = 0;
-    int rc=0;
-
-    rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
-    if( rc ) { /* this should not happen */
-       log_error("Ooops; the key vanished  - can't check the trust\n");
-       rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
-       goto leave;
+  PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+  unsigned int trustlevel;
+  int rc=0;
+
+  rc = get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid );
+  if (rc) 
+    { /* this should not happen */
+      log_error("Ooops; the key vanished  - can't check the trust\n");
+      rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+      goto leave;
     }
 
-  retry:
-    rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-    if( rc ) {
-       log_error("check trust failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
-       goto leave;
+  if ( opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS )
+    {
+      if( !opt.quiet )
+        log_info(_("WARNING: Using untrusted key!\n"));
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      goto leave;
     }
 
-    if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) {
-       write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
-       log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
-       log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
-    }
+  if(pk->maybe_revoked && !pk->is_revoked)
+    log_info(_("WARNING: this key might be revoked (revocation key"
+              " not present)\n"));
 
+  trustlevel = get_validity (pk, NULL);
 
-    switch( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) {
-      case TRUST_UNKNOWN: /* No pubkey in trustDB: Insert and check again */
-       rc = insert_trust_record( pk );
-       if( rc ) {
-           log_error("failed to insert it into the trustdb: %s\n",
-                                                     g10_errstr(rc) );
-           goto leave;
-       }
-       rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-       if( rc )
-           log_fatal("trust check after insert failed: %s\n",
-                                                     g10_errstr(rc) );
-       if( trustlevel == TRUST_UNKNOWN || trustlevel == TRUST_EXPIRED )
-           BUG();
-       goto retry;
-
-      case TRUST_EXPIRED:
-       log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
-       break;
-
-      case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
-       if( dont_try || opt.batch || opt.answer_no ) {
-           write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
-           log_info(_(
-           "WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!\n"));
-           log_info(_(
-           "         There is no indication that the "
-                                   "signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
-       }
-       else {
-           rc = add_ownertrust( pk );
-           if( rc ) {
-               dont_try = 1;
-               rc = 0;
-           }
-           goto retry;
-       }
-       break;
-
-      case TRUST_NEVER:
-       write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
-       log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
-       log_info(_("         The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
-       rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
-       break;
-
-      case TRUST_MARGINAL:
-       write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
-       log_info(_(
-        "WARNING: This key is not certified with sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"
-               ));
-       log_info(_(
-        "         It is not certain that the signature belongs to the owner.\n"
-                ));
-       break;
-
-      case TRUST_FULLY:
-       write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
-       break;
-
-      case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
-       write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
-       break;
-
-      default: BUG();
+  if ( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED) ) 
+    {
+      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
+      if(pk->is_revoked==2)
+       log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its"
+                  " designated revoker!\n"));
+      else
+       log_info(_("WARNING: This key has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         This could mean that the signature is forgery.\n"));
+      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
+    }
+  else if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_SUB_REVOKED) ) 
+    {
+      write_status( STATUS_KEYREVOKED );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This subkey has been revoked by its owner!\n"));
+      show_revocation_reason( pk, 0 );
+    }
+  
+  if ((trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED))
+    log_info (_("Note: This key has been disabled.\n"));
+
+  switch ( (trustlevel & TRUST_MASK) ) 
+    {
+    case TRUST_EXPIRED:
+      log_info(_("Note: This key has expired!\n"));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+        
+    default:
+      log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
+                 trustlevel);
+      /* fall thru */
+    case TRUST_UNKNOWN: 
+    case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
+                 " a trusted signature!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         There is no indication that the "
+                 "signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_NEVER:
+      /* currently we won't get that status */
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_NEVER );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: We do NOT trust this key!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         The signature is probably a FORGERY.\n"));
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      rc = G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_MARGINAL:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_MARGINAL );
+      log_info(_("WARNING: This key is not certified with"
+                 " sufficiently trusted signatures!\n"));
+      log_info(_("         It is not certain that the"
+                 " signature belongs to the owner.\n" ));
+      print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_FULLY:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_FULLY );
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
+
+    case TRUST_ULTIMATE:
+      write_status( STATUS_TRUST_ULTIMATE );
+      if (opt.with_fingerprint)
+        print_fingerprint (pk, NULL, 1);
+      break;
     }
 
-
-  leave:
-    free_public_key( pk );
-    return rc;
+ leave:
+  free_public_key( pk );
+  return rc;
 }
 
 
@@ -463,123 +602,505 @@ release_pk_list( PK_LIST pk_list )
     }
 }
 
+
+static int
+key_present_in_pk_list(PK_LIST pk_list, PKT_public_key *pk)
+{
+    for( ; pk_list; pk_list = pk_list->next)
+       if (cmp_public_keys(pk_list->pk, pk) == 0)
+           return 0;
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return a malloced string with a default reciepient if there is any
+ */
+static char *
+default_recipient(void)
+{
+    PKT_secret_key *sk;
+    byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+    size_t n;
+    char *p;
+    int i;
+
+    if( opt.def_recipient )
+       return m_strdup( opt.def_recipient );
+    if( !opt.def_recipient_self )
+       return NULL;
+    sk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk );
+    i = get_seckey_byname( sk, NULL, 0 );
+    if( i ) {
+       free_secret_key( sk );
+       return NULL;
+    }
+    n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN;
+    fingerprint_from_sk( sk, fpr, &n );
+    free_secret_key( sk );
+    p = m_alloc( 2*n+3 );
+    *p++ = '0';
+    *p++ = 'x';
+    for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+       sprintf( p+2*i, "%02X", fpr[i] );
+    p -= 2;
+    return p;
+}
+
+static int
+expand_id(const char *id,STRLIST *into,unsigned int flags)
+{
+  struct groupitem *groups;
+  int count=0;
+
+  for(groups=opt.grouplist;groups;groups=groups->next)
+    {
+      /* need strcasecmp() here, as this should be localized */
+      if(strcasecmp(groups->name,id)==0)
+       {
+         STRLIST each,sl;
+
+         /* this maintains the current utf8-ness */
+         for(each=groups->values;each;each=each->next)
+           {
+             sl=add_to_strlist(into,each->d);
+             sl->flags=flags;
+             count++;
+           }
+
+         break;
+       }
+    }
+
+  return count;
+}
+
+/* For simplicity, and to avoid potential loops, we only expand once -
+   you can't make an alias that points to an alias. */
+static STRLIST
+expand_group(STRLIST input)
+{
+  STRLIST sl,output=NULL,rover;
+
+  for(rover=input;rover;rover=rover->next)
+    if(expand_id(rover->d,&output,rover->flags)==0)
+      {
+       /* Didn't find any groups, so use the existing string */
+       sl=add_to_strlist(&output,rover->d);
+       sl->flags=rover->flags;
+      }
+
+  return output;
+}
+
 int
-build_pk_list( STRLIST remusr, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned usage )
+build_pk_list( STRLIST rcpts, PK_LIST *ret_pk_list, unsigned use )
 {
     PK_LIST pk_list = NULL;
     PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
     int rc=0;
+    int any_recipients=0;
+    STRLIST rov,remusr;
+    char *def_rec = NULL;
 
-    if( !remusr && !opt.batch ) { /* ask */
+    if(opt.grouplist)
+      remusr=expand_group(rcpts);
+    else
+      remusr=rcpts;
+
+    /* check whether there are any recipients in the list and build the
+     * list of the encrypt-to ones (we always trust them) */
+    for( rov = remusr; rov; rov = rov->next ) {
+       if( !(rov->flags & 1) )
+         {
+           any_recipients = 1;
+
+           if((rov->flags&2) && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
+             {
+               log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
+                        "--hidden-recipient",
+                        compliance_option_string());
+
+               compliance_failure();
+             }
+         }
+       else if( (use & PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC) && !opt.no_encrypt_to ) {
+           pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+           pk->req_usage = use;
+           /* We can encrypt-to a disabled key */
+           if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, rov->d, NULL, NULL, 1 )) ) {
+               free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+               log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                              rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
+               goto fail;
+            }
+           else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
+               /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
+                * in the list */
+               if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
+                   free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                   log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
+                                                           rov->d);
+               }
+               else {
+                   PK_LIST r;
+                   r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+                   r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                   r->next = pk_list;
+                   r->flags = (rov->flags&2)?1:0;
+                   pk_list = r;
+
+                   if(r->flags&1 && (PGP2 || PGP6 || PGP7 || PGP8))
+                     {
+                       log_info(_("you may not use %s while in %s mode\n"),
+                                "--hidden-encrypt-to",
+                                compliance_option_string());
+
+                       compliance_failure();
+                     }
+               }
+           }
+           else {
+               free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+               log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), rov->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                              rov->d, strlen (rov->d), -1);
+               goto fail;
+           }
+       }
+    }
+
+    if( !any_recipients && !opt.batch ) { /* ask */
+       int have_def_rec;
        char *answer=NULL;
+       STRLIST backlog=NULL;
 
-       tty_printf(_(
-               "You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n\n"));
+       if(pk_list)
+         any_recipients = 1;
+       def_rec = default_recipient();
+       have_def_rec = !!def_rec;
+       if( !have_def_rec )
+           tty_printf(_(
+               "You did not specify a user ID. (you may use \"-r\")\n"));
        for(;;) {
            rc = 0;
            m_free(answer);
-           answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
-                                  _("Enter the user ID: "));
-           trim_spaces(answer);
-           cpr_kill_prompt();
-           if( !*answer )
+           if( have_def_rec ) {
+               answer = def_rec;
+               def_rec = NULL;
+           }
+           else if(backlog) {
+             answer=pop_strlist(&backlog);
+           }
+           else
+             {
+               PK_LIST iter;
+
+               tty_printf("\n");
+               tty_printf(_("Current recipients:\n"));
+               for(iter=pk_list;iter;iter=iter->next)
+                 {
+                   u32 keyid[2];
+
+                   keyid_from_pk(iter->pk,keyid);
+                   tty_printf("%4u%c/%s %s \"",
+                              nbits_from_pk(iter->pk),
+                              pubkey_letter(iter->pk->pubkey_algo),
+                              keystr(keyid),
+                              datestr_from_pk(iter->pk));
+
+                   if(iter->pk->user_id)
+                     tty_print_utf8_string(iter->pk->user_id->name,
+                                           iter->pk->user_id->len);
+                   else
+                     {
+                       size_t n;
+                       char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &n );
+                       tty_print_utf8_string( p, n );
+                       m_free(p);
+                     }
+                   tty_printf("\"\n");
+                 }
+
+               answer = cpr_get_utf8("pklist.user_id.enter",
+                        _("\nEnter the user ID.  End with an empty line: "));
+               trim_spaces(answer);
+               cpr_kill_prompt();
+             }
+           if( !answer || !*answer ) {
+               m_free(answer);
                break;
+           }
+           if(expand_id(answer,&backlog,0))
+             continue;
            if( pk )
                free_public_key( pk );
            pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-           pk->pubkey_usage = usage;
-           rc = get_pubkey_byname( NULL, pk, answer, NULL );
+           pk->req_usage = use;
+           rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, answer, NULL, NULL, 0 );
            if( rc )
                tty_printf(_("No such user ID.\n"));
-           else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, usage)) ) {
-               int trustlevel;
-
-               rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-               if( rc ) {
-                   log_error("error checking pk of '%s': %s\n",
-                                                     answer, g10_errstr(rc) );
+           else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
+               if( have_def_rec ) {
+                   if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
+                       free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                       log_info(_("skipped: public key "
+                                  "already set as default recipient\n") );
+                   }
+                   else {
+                       PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+                       r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                       r->next = pk_list;
+                       r->flags = 0; /* no throwing default ids */
+                       pk_list = r;
+                   }
+                   any_recipients = 1;
+                   continue;
                }
-               else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
-                   PK_LIST r;
-
-                   r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-                   r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-                   r->next = pk_list;
-                   r->mark = 0;
-                   pk_list = r;
-                   break;
+               else {
+                   int trustlevel;
+                   
+                   trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
+                   if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
+                       tty_printf(_("Public key is disabled.\n") );
+                   }
+                   else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
+                       /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
+                        * in the list */
+                       if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
+                           free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                           log_info(_("skipped: public key already set\n") );
+                       }
+                       else {
+                           PK_LIST r;
+                           r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+                           r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                           r->next = pk_list;
+                           r->flags = 0; /* no throwing interactive ids */
+                           pk_list = r;
+                       }
+                       any_recipients = 1;
+                       continue;
+                   }
                }
            }
+           m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
+           have_def_rec = 0;
        }
-       m_free(answer);
        if( pk ) {
            free_public_key( pk );
            pk = NULL;
        }
     }
+    else if( !any_recipients && (def_rec = default_recipient()) ) {
+       pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+       pk->req_usage = use;
+       /* The default recipient may be disabled */
+       rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, def_rec, NULL, NULL, 1 );
+       if( rc )
+           log_error(_("unknown default recipient \"%s\"\n"), def_rec );
+       else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use)) ) {
+         /* Mark any_recipients here since the default recipient
+             would have been used if it wasn't already there.  It
+             doesn't really matter if we got this key from the default
+             recipient or an encrypt-to. */
+         any_recipients = 1;
+         if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0)
+           log_info(_("skipped: public key already set as default recipient\n"));
+         else {
+           PK_LIST r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+           r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+           r->next = pk_list;
+           r->flags = 0; /* no throwing default ids */
+           pk_list = r;
+         }
+       }
+       if( pk ) {
+           free_public_key( pk );
+           pk = NULL;
+       }
+       m_free(def_rec); def_rec = NULL;
+    }
     else {
+       any_recipients = 0;
        for(; remusr; remusr = remusr->next ) {
+           if( (remusr->flags & 1) )
+               continue; /* encrypt-to keys are already handled */
 
            pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
-           pk->pubkey_usage = usage;
-           if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( NULL, pk, remusr->d, NULL )) ) {
+           pk->req_usage = use;
+           if( (rc = get_pubkey_byname( pk, remusr->d, NULL, NULL, 0 )) ) {
                free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
                log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                              remusr->d, strlen (remusr->d),
+                                              -1);
+               goto fail;
            }
-           else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, usage )) ) {
+           else if( !(rc=check_pubkey_algo2(pk->pubkey_algo, use )) ) {
                int trustlevel;
 
-               rc = check_trust( pk, &trustlevel );
-               if( rc ) {
-                   free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
-                   log_error(_("%s: error checking key: %s\n"),
-                                                     remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+               trustlevel = get_validity (pk, pk->user_id);
+               if( (trustlevel & TRUST_FLAG_DISABLED) ) {
+                   free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                   log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key is disabled\n"),
+                                                                   remusr->d);
+                    write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                                  remusr->d,
+                                                  strlen (remusr->d),
+                                                  -1);
+                   rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+                   goto fail;
                }
                else if( do_we_trust_pre( pk, trustlevel ) ) {
                    /* note: do_we_trust may have changed the trustlevel */
-                   PK_LIST r;
 
-                   r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
-                   r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
-                   r->next = pk_list;
-                   r->mark = 0;
-                   pk_list = r;
+                   /* We have at least one valid recipient. It doesn't matters
+                    * if this recipient is already present. */
+                   any_recipients = 1;
+
+                   /* Skip the actual key if the key is already present
+                    * in the list */
+                   if (key_present_in_pk_list(pk_list, pk) == 0) {
+                       free_public_key(pk); pk = NULL;
+                       log_info(_("%s: skipped: public key already present\n"),
+                                                                   remusr->d);
+                   }
+                   else {
+                       PK_LIST r;
+                       r = m_alloc( sizeof *r );
+                       r->pk = pk; pk = NULL;
+                       r->next = pk_list;
+                       r->flags = (remusr->flags&2)?1:0;
+                       pk_list = r;
+                   }
                }
                else { /* we don't trust this pk */
                    free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+                    write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "10 ",
+                                                  remusr->d,
+                                                  strlen (remusr->d),
+                                                  -1);
+                   rc=G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+                   goto fail;
                }
            }
            else {
                free_public_key( pk ); pk = NULL;
+                write_status_text_and_buffer (STATUS_INV_RECP, "0 ",
+                                              remusr->d,
+                                              strlen (remusr->d),
+                                              -1);
                log_error(_("%s: skipped: %s\n"), remusr->d, g10_errstr(rc) );
+               goto fail;
            }
        }
     }
 
-
-    if( !rc && !pk_list ) {
+    if( !rc && !any_recipients ) {
        log_error(_("no valid addressees\n"));
+        write_status_text (STATUS_NO_RECP, "0");
        rc = G10ERR_NO_USER_ID;
     }
 
+ fail:
+
     if( rc )
        release_pk_list( pk_list );
     else
        *ret_pk_list = pk_list;
+    if(opt.grouplist)
+      free_strlist(remusr);
     return rc;
 }
 
 
+/* In pgp6 mode, disallow all ciphers except IDEA (1), 3DES (2), and
+   CAST5 (3), all hashes except MD5 (1), SHA1 (2), and RIPEMD160 (3),
+   and all compressions except none (0) and ZIP (1).  pgp7 and pgp8
+   mode expands the cipher list to include AES128 (7), AES192 (8),
+   AES256 (9), and TWOFISH (10).  pgp8 adds the SHA-256 hash (8).  For
+   a true PGP key all of this is unneeded as they are the only items
+   present in the preferences subpacket, but checking here covers the
+   weird case of encrypting to a key that had preferences from a
+   different implementation which was then used with PGP.  I am not
+   completely comfortable with this as the right thing to do, as it
+   slightly alters the list of what the user is supposedly requesting.
+   It is not against the RFC however, as the preference chosen will
+   never be one that the user didn't specify somewhere ("The
+   implementation may use any mechanism to pick an algorithm in the
+   intersection"), and PGP has no mechanism to fix such a broken
+   preference list, so I'm including it. -dms */
+
+int
+algo_available( preftype_t preftype, int algo, void *hint )
+{
+  if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
+    {
+      if(PGP6 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5))
+       return 0;
+      
+      if(PGP7 && (algo != CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_3DES
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_CAST5
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES192
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_AES256
+                 && algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
+       return 0;
+
+      /* PGP8 supports all the ciphers we do.. */
+
+      return algo && !check_cipher_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH )
+    {
+      if(hint && ((*(int *)hint) != md_digest_length(algo)))
+       return 0;
+
+      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+                           && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+                           && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160))
+       return 0;
+
+
+      if(PGP8 && (algo != DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
+                 && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+                 && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160
+                 && algo != DIGEST_ALGO_SHA256))
+       return 0;
+
+      return algo && !check_digest_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
+    {
+      if((PGP6 || PGP7) && (algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_NONE
+                           && algo != COMPRESS_ALGO_ZIP))
+       return 0;
+
+      /* PGP8 supports all the compression algos we do */
+
+      return !check_compress_algo( algo );
+    }
+  else
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
 /****************
  * Return -1 if we could not find an algorithm.
  */
 int
-select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype )
+select_algo_from_prefs(PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype, int request, void *hint)
 {
     PK_LIST pkr;
     u32 bits[8];
-    byte *pref = NULL;
-    size_t npref;
+    const prefitem_t *prefs;
     int i, j;
     int compr_hack=0;
     int any;
@@ -592,35 +1113,68 @@ select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype )
        u32 mask[8];
 
        memset( mask, 0, 8 * sizeof *mask );
-       if( !pkr->pk->local_id )
-           BUG(); /* if this occurs, we can use get_ownertrust to set it */
-       if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM )
-           bits[0] = (1<<2); /* 3DES is implicitly there */
-       m_free(pref);
-       pref = get_pref_data( pkr->pk->local_id, pkr->pk->namehash, &npref);
+       if( preftype == PREFTYPE_SYM ) {
+         if( PGP2 &&
+             pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
+             pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
+           mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* IDEA is implicitly there for v3 keys
+                                 with v3 selfsigs (rfc2440:12.1) if
+                                 --pgp2 mode is on.  This doesn't
+                                 mean it's actually available, of
+                                 course. */
+         else
+           mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* 3DES is implicitly there for everyone else */
+       }
+       else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_HASH ) {
+         /* While I am including this code for completeness, note
+            that currently --pgp2 mode locks the hash at MD5, so this
+            function will never even be called.  Even if the hash
+            wasn't locked at MD5, we don't support sign+encrypt in
+            --pgp2 mode, and that's the only time PREFTYPE_HASH is
+            used anyway. -dms */
+         if( PGP2 &&
+             pkr->pk->version < 4 &&
+             pkr->pk->selfsigversion < 4 )
+           mask[0] |= (1<<1); /* MD5 is there for v3 keys with v3
+                                 selfsigs when --pgp2 is on. */
+         else
+           mask[0] |= (1<<2); /* SHA1 is there for everyone else */
+       }
+       else if( preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP )
+         mask[0] |= (1<<0); /* Uncompressed is implicit */
+
+        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
+            prefs = pkr->pk->user_id->prefs;
+        else
+            prefs = pkr->pk->prefs;
+
        any = 0;
-       if( pref ) {
-           /*log_hexdump("raw: ", pref, npref );*/
-           for(i=0; i+1 < npref; i+=2 ) {
-               if( pref[i] == preftype ) {
-                   mask[pref[i+1]/32] |= 1 << (pref[i+1]%32);
+       if( prefs ) {
+           for (i=0; prefs[i].type; i++ ) {
+               if( prefs[i].type == preftype ) {
+                   mask[prefs[i].value/32] |= 1 << (prefs[i].value%32);
                    any = 1;
                }
            }
        }
-       if( (!pref || !any) && preftype == PREFTYPE_COMPR ) {
+
+       if( (!prefs || !any) && preftype == PREFTYPE_ZIP ) {
            mask[0] |= 3; /* asume no_compression and old pgp */
            compr_hack = 1;
        }
 
-       /*log_debug("mask=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
+#if 0
+       log_debug("pref mask=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
               (ulong)mask[7], (ulong)mask[6], (ulong)mask[5], (ulong)mask[4],
-            (ulong)mask[3], (ulong)mask[2], (ulong)mask[1], (ulong)mask[0]);*/
+            (ulong)mask[3], (ulong)mask[2], (ulong)mask[1], (ulong)mask[0]);
+#endif
        for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
            bits[i] &= mask[i];
-       /*log_debug("bits=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
+#if 0
+       log_debug("pref bits=%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX%08lX\n",
               (ulong)bits[7], (ulong)bits[6], (ulong)bits[5], (ulong)bits[4],
-            (ulong)bits[3], (ulong)bits[2], (ulong)bits[1], (ulong)bits[0]);*/
+            (ulong)bits[3], (ulong)bits[2], (ulong)bits[1], (ulong)bits[0]);
+#endif
     }
     /* usable algorithms are now in bits
      * We now use the last key from pk_list to select
@@ -630,35 +1184,101 @@ select_algo_from_prefs( PK_LIST pk_list, int preftype )
      */
     i = -1;
     any = 0;
-    if( pref ) {
-       for(j=0; j+1 < npref; j+=2 ) {
-           if( pref[j] == preftype ) {
-               any = 1;
-               if( (bits[pref[j+1]/32] & (1<<(pref[j+1]%32))) ) {
-                   i = pref[j+1];
-                   break;
+
+    /* Can we use the requested algorithm? */
+    if(request>-1 && (bits[request/32] & (1<<(request%32))) &&
+       algo_available(preftype,request,hint))
+      return request;
+
+    /* If we have personal prefs set, use them instead of the last key */
+    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_SYM && opt.personal_cipher_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_cipher_prefs;
+    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH && opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_digest_prefs;
+    else if(preftype==PREFTYPE_ZIP && opt.personal_compress_prefs)
+      prefs=opt.personal_compress_prefs;
+
+    if( prefs ) {
+       for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ ) {
+           if( prefs[j].type == preftype ) {
+                if( (bits[prefs[j].value/32] & (1<<(prefs[j].value%32))) ) {
+                   if( algo_available( preftype, prefs[j].value, hint ) ) {
+                       any = 1;
+                       i = prefs[j].value;
+                       break;
+                   }
                }
            }
        }
     }
-    if( !pref || !any ) {
+    if( !prefs || !any ) {
        for(j=0; j < 256; j++ )
            if( (bits[j/32] & (1<<(j%32))) ) {
-               i = j;
-               break;
+               if( algo_available( preftype, j, hint ) ) {
+                   i = j;
+                   break;
+               }
            }
     }
-    /*log_debug("prefs of type %d: selected %d\n", preftype, i );*/
+
+#if 0
+    log_debug("prefs of type %d: selected %d\n", preftype, i );
+#endif
     if( compr_hack && !i ) {
        /* selected no compression, but we should check whether
         * algorithm 1 is also available (the ordering is not relevant
         * in this case). */
        if( bits[0] & (1<<1) )
-           i = 1;  /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
+           i = 1; /* yep; we can use compression algo 1 */
     }
 
-    m_free(pref);
+    /* "If you are building an authentication system, the recipient
+       may specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer
+       would be foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the
+       recipient requests it." RFC2440:13.  If we settle on MD5, and
+       SHA1 is also available, use SHA1 instead.  Of course, if the
+       user intentionally chose MD5 (by putting it in their personal
+       prefs), then we should do what they say. */
+
+    if(preftype==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
+       i==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 && (bits[0] & (1<<DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1)))
+      {
+       i=DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
+
+       if(opt.personal_digest_prefs)
+         for(j=0; prefs[j].type; j++ )
+           if(opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].type==PREFTYPE_HASH &&
+              opt.personal_digest_prefs[j].value==DIGEST_ALGO_MD5)
+             {
+               i=DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+               break;
+             }
+      }
+
     return i;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Select the MDC flag from the pk_list.  We can only use MDC if all recipients
+ * support this feature 
+ */
+int
+select_mdc_from_pklist (PK_LIST pk_list)
+{
+    PK_LIST pkr;
 
+    if( !pk_list )
+       return 0;
+
+    for (pkr = pk_list; pkr; pkr = pkr->next) {
+        int mdc;
+
+        if (pkr->pk->user_id) /* selected by user ID */
+            mdc = pkr->pk->user_id->mdc_feature;
+        else
+            mdc = pkr->pk->mdc_feature;
+        if (!mdc)
+            return 0; /* at least one recipient does not support it */
+    }
+    return 1; /* can be used */
+}