(show_key_with_all_names): Print the card S/N.
[gnupg.git] / g10 / seckey-cert.c
index c153782..7356cb2 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* seckey-cert.c -  secret key certificate packet handling
- *     Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ *               2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
 #include <string.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 
-#include <gcrypt.h>
+#include "gpg.h"
 #include "util.h"
 #include "memory.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "mpi.h"
 #include "keydb.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "main.h"
 #include "options.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 #include "status.h"
-
+#include "pkglue.h"
 
 static int
-do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
+do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
+          int *canceled )
 {
     byte *buffer;
     u16 csum=0;
     int i, res;
     unsigned nbytes;
+    gpg_error_t rc;
 
     if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
        DEK *dek = NULL;
        u32 keyid[4]; /* 4! because we need two of them */
-       GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
+       CIPHER_HANDLE cipher_hd=NULL;
        PKT_secret_key *save_sk;
 
-       if( sk->protect.algo == GCRY_CIPHER_NONE )
+       if( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+           log_info(_("secret key parts are not available\n"));
+           return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+       }
+       if( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_NONE )
            BUG();
        if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) ) {
-           log_info(_("protection algorithm %d is not supported\n"),
-                       sk->protect.algo );
-           return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
+           log_info(_("protection algorithm %d%s is not supported\n"),
+                       sk->protect.algo,sk->protect.algo==1?" (IDEA)":"" );
+           if (sk->protect.algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+              {
+                write_status (STATUS_RSA_OR_IDEA);
+                idea_cipher_warn (0);
+              }
+           return GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO;
        }
        keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
        keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0;
        if( !sk->is_primary ) {
-           PKT_secret_key *sk2 = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sk2 );
-           if( !get_primary_seckey( sk2, keyid ) )
-               keyid_from_sk( sk2, keyid+2 );
-           free_secret_key( sk2 );
+            keyid[2] = sk->main_keyid[0];
+            keyid[3] = sk->main_keyid[1];
        }
        dek = passphrase_to_dek( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo, sk->protect.algo,
-                                &sk->protect.s2k, 0 );
-       if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
-                                     GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
-                                     GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
-                                     | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
-                                          0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ) )
-                                   ) {
-           BUG();
-       }
+                                &sk->protect.s2k, mode,
+                                 tryagain_text, canceled );
+        if (!dek && canceled && *canceled)
+           return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
+
+       rc = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo,
+                               GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
+                               GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
+                               | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
+                                  0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC));
+        if (rc)
+          log_fatal ("cipher open failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
 
-       if( gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
-           log_fatal("set key failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
-       m_free(dek);
+       rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen);
+        if (rc)
+          log_fatal ("set key failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
+
+       xfree (dek);
        save_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
-       if( gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen ))
-           log_fatal("set IV failed: %s\n", gcry_strerror(-1) );
+       gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen);
        csum = 0;
        if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
            int ndata;
+            unsigned int ndatabits;
            byte *p, *data;
+            u16 csumc = 0;
 
            i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
-           assert( mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
-           p = mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndata );
-           data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
+            assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ));
+            p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
+            ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
+            if ( ndata > 1 )
+                csumc = p[ndata-2] << 8 | p[ndata-1];
+           data = gcry_xmalloc_secure ( ndata );
            gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, p, ndata );
-           mpi_free( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
+           gcry_mpi_release ( sk->skey[i] ); sk->skey[i] = NULL ;
            p = data;
-           if( ndata < 2 ) {
-               log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
-               sk->csum = 0;
-               csum = 1;
-           }
-           else {
-               csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
-               sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
-           }
-           /* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
-            * because the length das an abritary value */
-           if( sk->csum == csum ) {
-               for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
-                   nbytes = ndata;
-                   sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
-                   ndata -= nbytes;
-                   p += nbytes;
-               }
-           }
-           m_free(data);
+            if (sk->protect.sha1chk) {
+                /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect
+                   tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa
+                   attack */
+                sk->csum = 0;
+                csum = 1;
+                if( ndata < 20 ) 
+                    log_error("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n");
+                else {
+                    gcry_md_hd_t h;
+
+                    if ( gcry_md_open (&h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 1))
+                        BUG(); /* algo not available */
+                    gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
+                    gcry_md_final (h);
+                    if (!memcmp (gcry_md_read (h, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
+                                 data + ndata - 20, 20) ) {
+                        /* digest does match.  We have to keep the old
+                           style checksum in sk->csum, so that the
+                           test used for unprotected keys does work.
+                           This test gets used when we are adding new
+                           keys. */
+                        sk->csum = csum = checksum (data, ndata-20);
+                    }
+                    gcry_md_close (h);
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                if( ndata < 2 ) {
+                    log_error("not enough bytes for checksum\n");
+                    sk->csum = 0;
+                    csum = 1;
+                }
+                else {
+                    csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
+                    sk->csum = data[ndata-2] << 8 | data[ndata-1];
+                    if ( sk->csum != csum ) {
+                        /* This is a PGP 7.0.0 workaround */
+                        sk->csum = csumc; /* take the encrypted one */
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+                
+            /* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
+               because the length may have an arbitrary value */
+            if( sk->csum == csum ) {
+                for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
+                   assert( gcry_is_secure( p ) );
+                   res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP,
+                                         p, ndata, &nbytes);
+                   if( res )
+                       log_bug ("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: %s\n",
+                                 gpg_strerror (res));
+                    ndata -= nbytes;
+                    p += nbytes;
+                }
+                /* Note: at this point ndata should be 2 for a simple
+                   checksum or 20 for the sha1 digest */
+            }
+           xfree (data);
        }
        else {
            for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
                    i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
-               buffer = mpi_get_secure_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
-               gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
-               assert( mpi_is_protected(sk->skey[i]) );
-               gcry_cipher_decrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, nbytes, NULL, 0 );
-               mpi_set_buffer( sk->skey[i], buffer, nbytes, 0 );
-               mpi_clear_protect_flag( sk->skey[i] );
-               csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
-               m_free( buffer );
-           }
-           if( opt.emulate_bugs & EMUBUG_GPGCHKSUM ) {
-              csum = sk->csum;
+                byte *p;
+                int ndata;
+                unsigned int ndatabits;
+
+                assert( gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
+                p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque( sk->skey[i], &ndatabits );
+                ndata = (ndatabits+7)/8;
+                assert (ndata >= 2);
+                assert (ndata == ((p[0] << 8 | p[1]) + 7)/8 + 2);
+                buffer = gcry_xmalloc_secure (ndata);
+               gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
+                buffer[0] = p[0];
+                buffer[1] = p[1];
+                gcry_cipher_decrypt (cipher_hd, buffer+2, ndata-2,
+                                     p+2, ndata-2);
+                csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
+                gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]);
+               res = gcry_mpi_scan( &sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FMT_USG,
+                                    buffer, ndata, &ndata );
+               if( res )
+                   log_bug ("gcry_mpi_scan failed in do_check: %s\n", 
+                             gpg_strerror (res));
+
+                assert (sk->skey[i]);
+               xfree (buffer);
+/*             csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
            }
        }
-       gcry_cipher_close( cipher_hd );
+       gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd);
        /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */
        if( csum != sk->csum ) {
            copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
+            passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
            free_secret_key( save_sk );
-           return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
+           return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
        }
        /* the checksum may fail, so we also check the key itself */
-       res = pubkey_check_secret_key( sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey );
-       if( res ) {
-           copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
-           free_secret_key( save_sk );
-           return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
-       }
+       res = pk_check_secret_key (sk->pubkey_algo, sk->skey);
+       if (res) {
+            copy_secret_key( sk, save_sk );
+            passphrase_clear_cache ( keyid, sk->pubkey_algo );
+            free_secret_key( save_sk );
+           return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
+       }
        free_secret_key( save_sk );
        sk->is_protected = 0;
     }
@@ -155,7 +232,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
            csum += checksum_mpi( sk->skey[i] );
        }
        if( csum != sk->csum )
-           return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
+           return GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM;
     }
 
     return 0;
@@ -166,21 +243,38 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk )
 /****************
  * Check the secret key
  * Ask up to 3 (or n) times for a correct passphrase
+ * If n is negative, disable the key info prompt and make n=abs(n)
  */
 int
 check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
 {
-    int rc = G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
-    int i;
+    int rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE);
+    int i,mode;
+
+    if (sk && sk->is_protected && sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002)
+      return 0; /* Let the scdaemon handle it. */
+
+    if(n<0)
+      {
+       n=abs(n);
+       mode=1;
+      }
+    else
+      mode=0;
 
     if( n < 1 )
-       n = opt.batch? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
+       n = (opt.batch && !opt.use_agent)? 1 : 3; /* use the default value */
 
-    for(i=0; i < n && rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS; i++ ) {
-       if( i )
-           log_info(_("Invalid passphrase; please try again ...\n"));
-       rc = do_check( sk );
-       if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_PASS && is_status_enabled() ) {
+    for(i=0; i < n && gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE; i++ ) {
+        int canceled = 0;
+        const char *tryagain = NULL;
+       if (i) {
+            tryagain = N_("Invalid passphrase; please try again");
+            log_info (_("%s ...\n"), _(tryagain));
+        }
+       rc = do_check( sk, tryagain, mode, &canceled );
+       if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_PASSPHRASE
+            && is_status_enabled() ) {
            u32 kid[2];
            char buf[50];
 
@@ -188,7 +282,7 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
            sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX", (ulong)kid[0], (ulong)kid[1]);
            write_status_text( STATUS_BAD_PASSPHRASE, buf );
        }
-       if( have_static_passphrase() )
+       if( have_static_passphrase() || canceled)
            break;
     }
 
@@ -201,11 +295,14 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
 /****************
  * check whether the secret key is protected.
  * Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm
+ *                           -2 indicates a card stub.
  */
 int
 is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_key *sk )
 {
-    return sk->is_protected? sk->protect.algo : 0;
+    return sk->is_protected?
+               sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1002? -2
+                                           : sk->protect.algo : 0;
 }
 
 
@@ -225,99 +322,125 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
        return 0;
 
     if( !sk->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
-       GCRY_CIPHER_HD cipher_hd=NULL;
+       gcry_cipher_hd_t cipher_hd=NULL;
 
        if( openpgp_cipher_test_algo( sk->protect.algo ) )
-           rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
+          {
+           rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO); /* unsupport
+                                                     protection
+                                                     algorithm */
+          }
        else {
            print_cipher_algo_note( sk->protect.algo );
-           if( !(cipher_hd = gcry_cipher_open( sk->protect.algo,
-                                         GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
-                                         GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
-                                         | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
-                                             0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) ))
-                                        ) {
-               BUG();
-           }
-
-
-           rc = gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
-           if( rc == GCRYERR_WEAK_KEY ) {
+           rc = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, sk->protect.algo,
+                                   GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB,
+                                   GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE
+                                   | (sk->protect.algo >= 100 ?
+                                      0 : GCRY_CIPHER_ENABLE_SYNC) );
+            if (rc)
+              BUG();
+           if( gcry_cipher_setkey( cipher_hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ) )
                log_info(_("WARNING: Weak key detected"
                           " - please change passphrase again.\n"));
-               rc = 0;
-           }
-           else if( rc )
-               BUG();
-
-           /* set the IV length */
-           {   int blocksize = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen( sk->protect.algo );
-               if( blocksize != 8 && blocksize != 16 )
-                   log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %d\n", blocksize );
-               sk->protect.ivlen = blocksize;
-           }
-
+           sk->protect.ivlen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_blklen(sk->protect.algo);
            assert( sk->protect.ivlen <= DIM(sk->protect.iv) );
-           randomize_buffer(sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, 1);
+           if( sk->protect.ivlen != 8 && sk->protect.ivlen != 16 )
+               BUG(); /* yes, we are very careful */
+           gcry_create_nonce (sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen);
            gcry_cipher_setiv( cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen );
            if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
-             #define NMPIS (PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY - PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY)
-               byte *bufarr[NMPIS];
-               unsigned narr[NMPIS];
-               unsigned nbits[NMPIS];
+                unsigned char *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+               unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+               unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
                int ndata=0;
                byte *p, *data;
 
                for(j=0, i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
                        i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++, j++ ) {
-                   assert( !mpi_is_opaque( sk->skey[i] ) );
-                   bufarr[j] = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &narr[j], NULL );
-                   nbits[j]  = mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
+                   assert( !gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i],
+                                                GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ));
+
+                   if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, bufarr+j,
+                                         narr+j, sk->skey[i]))
+                       BUG();
+
+                   nbits[j]  = gcry_mpi_get_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
                    ndata += narr[j] + 2;
                }
-               for( ; j < NMPIS; j++ )
+               for( ; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY; j++ )
                    bufarr[j] = NULL;
-               ndata += 2; /* for checksum */
+               ndata += opt.simple_sk_checksum? 2 : 20; /* for checksum */
 
-               data = m_alloc_secure( ndata );
+               data = xmalloc_secure ( ndata );
                p = data;
-               for(j=0; j < NMPIS && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
+               for(j=0; j < PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY && bufarr[j]; j++ ) {
                    p[0] = nbits[j] >> 8 ;
                    p[1] = nbits[j];
                    p += 2;
                    memcpy(p, bufarr[j], narr[j] );
                    p += narr[j];
-                   m_free(bufarr[j]);
+                   xfree (bufarr[j]);
                }
-             #undef NMPIS
-               csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
-               sk->csum = csum;
-               *p++ =  csum >> 8;
-               *p++ =  csum;
-               assert( p == data+ndata );
+                
+                if (opt.simple_sk_checksum) {
+                    log_info (_("generating the deprecated 16-bit checksum"
+                              " for secret key protection\n")); 
+                    csum = checksum( data, ndata-2);
+                    sk->csum = csum;
+                    *p++ =     csum >> 8;
+                    *p++ =     csum;
+                    sk->protect.sha1chk = 0;
+                }
+                else {
+                    gcry_md_hd_t h;
+
+                    if (gcry_md_open (&h, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 1))
+                        BUG(); /* algo not available */
+                    gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20);
+                    gcry_md_final (h);
+                    memcpy (p, gcry_md_read (h, GCRY_MD_SHA1), 20);
+                    p += 20;
+                    gcry_md_close (h);
+                    sk->csum = csum = 0;
+                    sk->protect.sha1chk = 1;
+                }
+                assert( p == data+ndata );
+
                gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, data, ndata, NULL, 0 );
                for(i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
                        i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
-                   mpi_free( sk->skey[i] );
+                   gcry_mpi_release ( sk->skey[i] );
                    sk->skey[i] = NULL;
                }
                i = pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
-               sk->skey[i] = mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata );
+               sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque(NULL, data, ndata*8);
            }
            else {
-               /* NOTE: we always recalculate the checksum because there
-                * are some test releases which calculated it wrong */
                csum = 0;
                for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
                        i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
-                   csum += checksum_mpi_counted_nbits( sk->skey[i] );
-                   buffer = mpi_get_buffer( sk->skey[i], &nbytes, NULL );
-                   gcry_cipher_sync( cipher_hd );
-                   assert( !mpi_is_protected(sk->skey[i]) );
-                   gcry_cipher_encrypt( cipher_hd, buffer, nbytes, NULL, 0 );
-                   mpi_set_buffer( sk->skey[i], buffer, nbytes, 0 );
-                   mpi_set_protect_flag( sk->skey[i] );
-                   m_free( buffer );
+                    byte *data;
+                   unsigned int nbits;
+
+                   csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]);
+                   if( gcry_mpi_aprint( GCRYMPI_FMT_USG, &buffer,
+                                         &nbytes, sk->skey[i] ) )
+                       BUG();
+                   gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd);
+                   assert (!gcry_mpi_get_flag( sk->skey[i],
+                                                GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ));
+                    data = xmalloc (nbytes+2);
+                    nbits  = gcry_mpi_get_nbits (sk->skey[i]);
+                    assert (nbytes == (nbits + 7)/8);
+                    data[0] = nbits >> 8;
+                    data[1] = nbits;
+                   gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipher_hd, data+2, nbytes,
+                                         buffer, nbytes);
+                   xfree ( buffer );
+                    
+                    gcry_mpi_release (sk->skey[i]);
+                    sk->skey[i] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, data,
+                                                       (nbytes+2)*8);
                }
                sk->csum = csum;
            }
@@ -327,4 +450,3 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
     }
     return rc;
 }
-