Make sure HOME et al have no unsafe characters.

[gnupg.git] / TODO

diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index d51ce1b..5182fc8 100644 (file)
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -1,121 +1,118 @@
-  * From: Nicolas Sierro 
-    Date: Thu, 17 Jun 2004 12:31:24 +0200
-    
-    I understand your concern regarding the GNU coding standards. In
-    zlib-1.2.1, apart from several bug fixes, the inflate code is about
-    20% faster and the crc32 code about 50% faster. Some memory leaks were
-    also fixed according to the ChangeLog.
-    
-    If it can help you, here is what I did to update the distribution is
-    to remove all files in the zlib folder except Makefile.am. To copy all
-    the file in the zlib121.zip archive to the zlib folder with the
-    exception of  configure, example.c, FAQ, INDEX,  Makefile, Makefile.in
-    and zlib.3. I then edited Makefile.am to match the new file list and
+                                                              -*- outline -*-
+
+* src/base64                                                  
+** Make parsing more robust
+   Currently we don't cope with overlong lines in the best way.
+** Check that we really release the ksba reader/writer objects.

 
 

-  * Reword the "Not enough entropy" messages.
+* sm/call-agent.c
+** Some code should go into import.c
+** When we allow concurrent service request in gpgsm, we
+   might want to have an agent context for each service request
+   (i.e. Assuan context).
+
+* sm/certchain.c
+** Try to keep certificate references somewhere
+  This will help with some of our caching code.  We also need to test
+  that caching; in particular "regtp_ca_chainlen".
+
+* sm/decrypt.c
+** replace leading zero in integer hack by a cleaner solution
+
+* sm/gpgsm.c
+** Implement --default-key
+** support the anyPolicy semantic
+** Should we prefer nonRepudiation certs over plain signing certs?
+   Also: Do we need a way to allow the selection of a qualSig cert
+   over a plain one?  The background is that the Telesec cards have 3
+   certs capable of signing all with the same subject name.
+
+* sm/keydb.c
+** Check file permissions
+** Check that all error code mapping is done.
+** Remove the inter-module dependencies between gpgsm and keybox
+** Add an source_of_key field
+
+* agent/
+** If we detect that a private key has been deleted
+   Bump the key event counter.
+
+* agent/command.c
+** Make sure that secure memory is used where appropriate
+
+* agent/pkdecrypt.c, agent/pksign.c
+** Support DSA
+
+* Move pkcs-1 encoding into libgcrypt.
+
+* Use a MAC to protect sensitive files.
+  The problem here is that we need yet another key and it is unlikely
+  that users are willing to remember that key too.  It is possible to
+  do this with a smartcard, though.
+
+* sm/export.c
+** Return an error code or a status info per user ID.
+
+* common/tlv.c
+  The parse_sexp function should not go into this file.  Check whether
+  we can change all S-expression handling code to make use of this
+  function.
+
+* scd
+** Application context vs. reader slot
+  We have 2 concurrent method of tracking whether a reader is in use:
+  Using the session_list in command.c and the lock_table in app.c.  It
+  would be better to do this just at one place. First we need to see
+  how we can support cards with multiple applications.
+** Resolve fixme in do_sign of app-dinsig.
+** Disconnect 
+  Card timeout is currently used as a boolean.  
+  Add disconnect support for the ccid driver.
+
+* Regression tests
+** Add a regression test to check the extkeyusage.
+
+* Windows port (W32)
+** Regex support is disabled
+  We need to adjust the test to find the regex we have anyway in 
+  gpg4win.  Is that regex compatible to the OpenPGP requirement?
+
+
+* sm/
+** check that we issue NO_SECKEY xxx if a -u key was not found
+   We don't. The messages returned are also wrong (recipient vs. signer).
+
+* g10/
+** issue a NO_SECKEY xxxx if a -u key was not found.
+
+* Extend selinux support to other modules
+  See also http://etbe.coker.com.au/2008/06/06/se-linux-support-gpg/
+
+* UTF-8 specific TODOs
+  None.
+
+* Manual
+** Document all gpgsm options.
+   
+
+* Pinpad Reader
+  We do not yet support P15 applications.  The trivial thing using
+  ASCII characters will be easy to implement but the other cases need
+  some more work.
+
+* Bugs
+
+
+* Howtos
+** Migrate OpenPGP keys to another system
+
+* Gpg-Agent Locale
+  Although we pass LC_MESSAGE from gpgsm et al. to Pinentry, this has
+  only an effect on the stock GTK strings (e.g. "OK") and not on any
+  strings gpg-agent generates and passes to Pinentry.  This defeats
+  our design goal to allow changing the locale without changing
+  gpg-agent's default locale (e.g. by the command updatestartuptty).

 
 

-  * Do we need a configure test for putenv?
-
-  * Check for consistent spelling of user ID, key ID etc.
-    Replace "user id not found" in getkey.c by "no valid user ID found".
- 
-  * Describe some pitfalls when using EGD.  Check that ~/.gnupg/entropy
-    really is the default.  What about needed permission?  
-
-  * Using an expired key for signing should give an error message
-    "expired key" and not "unusable key'.  Furthermore the error should
-    also be thrown when the default key has expired.  Reported by
-    Eric.VanBuggenhaut add AdValvas.be.
-
-  * pause scrolling help in --edit-key and elsewhere.
-
-  * getkey does not return revoked/expired keys - therefore it is not
-    possible to override it.
-
-  * Selection using +wordlist does not work.
-    What about adding a feature -word to the +wordlist search mode.
-
-  * Check the changes to the gpg random gatherer on all W32 platforms.
-
-  * Show more info does not work from edit->trust
-
-  * Check that no secret temporary results are stored in the result parameter
-    of the mpi functions.  We have already done this for mpi-mul.c 
-
-  * We need another special packet at the end of a clearsign message to mark
-    it's end and allow for multiple signature for one message.  And
-    add a real grammar to the code in mainproc.c
-
-  * If there is no secure memory, allocate more memory for the secure
-    memory block or do it in all cases.
-
-  * add some minor things vor VMS.
-
-  * Use DSA keys with the test suite (partly done)
-
-  * Fix the bug in the mips assembler code
-
-  * Add a way to show the fingerprint of an key signator's keys
-
-  * Add an is_valid flag to each user ID.
-
-  * Replace the printing of the user name by [self-signature] when
-    appropriate so that a key listing does not get clobbered.
-
-  * Concatenated encryption messages don't work corectly - only the
-    first one is processed.
-
-  * Add option to put the list of recipients (from the encryption
-    layer) into the signatures notation data.
-
-  * --disable-asm should still assemble _udiv_qrnnd when needed
-
-  * Get new assembler stuff from gmp 3.1
-
-  * add test cases for invalid data (scrambled armor or other random data)
-
-  * add checking of armor trailers.  Try to detect garbled header
-    lines.  Often one dash is missing due to sloppy cut+paste; so add
-    a warning note like the one for QP.
-
-  * the pubkey encrypt functions should do some sanity checks.
-
-  * "gpg filename.tar.gz.asc" should work like --verify (-sab).
-
-  * for messages created with "-t", it might make sense to append the
-    verification status of the message to the output (i.e. write something to
-    the --output file and not only to stderr.  However the problem is
-    that we consider the message transpatrent and don't have any
-    indication of the used character set.  To implement this feature
-    we need to make sure that all output is plain 7 bit ascii but
-    given that we need to print a user name, this does not make sense
-    at all.  The only way this can be implemented is by assuming that
-    the message is encoded in utf8 and hope tht everyone starts to use
-    utf8 instead of latin-1 or whatever RSN.  Hmmm, I myself should
-    start with this.
-
-  * keyflags don't distinguish between {certify,signature}-only.
-
-  * Instead of issuing a "signature packet without keyid" gpg should
-    try to get the keyID from a corresponding one-pass signature
-    packet (See bug report 817).  This is not easy to do as we don't
-    store the one-pass packets.
-
-  * cat foo | gpg --sign | gpg --list-packets
-    Does not list the signature packet.
-
-  * When presenting the result of a verification show the user ID with
-    the highest trust level first instead of the primary one.
-
-  * allow the use of option in gpg.conf. 
-
-  * export-secret-subkey where only one of the subkeys gets exported.
-
-  * Add the NEWSIG status.
-
-
-Things we won't do
-------------------
-
-  * New option --file-remove path-to-wipe-program ? 
+* RFC 4387: Operational Protocols: Certificate Store Access via HTTP
+  Do we support this?