/* findkey.c - locate the secret key
- * Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
*
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <assert.h>
#include "agent.h"
-/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp after locating it using the grip. Returns NULL if key is not available. */
-GCRY_SEXP
-agent_key_from_file (const unsigned char *grip)
+/* Helper to pass data to the check callback of the unprotect function. */
+struct try_unprotect_arg_s {
+ const unsigned char *protected_key;
+ unsigned char *unprotected_key;
+};
+
+
+
+int
+agent_write_private_key (const unsigned char *grip,
+ const void *buffer, size_t length, int force)
+{
+ int i;
+ char *fname;
+ FILE *fp;
+ char hexgrip[40+4+1];
+
+ for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+ sprintf (hexgrip+2*i, "%02X", grip[i]);
+ strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
+
+ fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL);
+ if (force)
+ fp = fopen (fname, "wb");
+ else
+ {
+ int fd;
+
+ if (!access (fname, F_OK))
+ {
+ log_error ("secret key file `%s' already exists\n", fname);
+ xfree (fname);
+ return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
+ }
+
+ /* We would like to create FNAME but only if it does not already
+ exist. We cannot make this guarantee just using POSIX (GNU
+ provides the "x" opentype for fopen, however, this is not
+ portable). Thus, we use the more flexible open function and
+ then use fdopen to obtain a stream.
+
+ The mode parameter to open is what fopen uses. It will be
+ combined with the process' umask automatically. */
+ fd = open (fname, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_RDWR,
+ S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWGRP | S_IROTH | S_IWOTH);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ fp = 0;
+ else
+ {
+ fp = fdopen (fd, "wb");
+ if (!fp)
+ {
+ int save_e = errno;
+ close (fd);
+ errno = save_e;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!fp)
+ {
+ gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+ log_error ("can't create `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
+ xfree (fname);
+ return tmperr;
+ }
+
+ if (fwrite (buffer, length, 1, fp) != 1)
+ {
+ gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+ log_error ("error writing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
+ fclose (fp);
+ remove (fname);
+ xfree (fname);
+ return tmperr;
+ }
+ if ( fclose (fp) )
+ {
+ gpg_error_t tmperr = gpg_error (gpg_err_code_from_errno (errno));
+ log_error ("error closing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
+ remove (fname);
+ xfree (fname);
+ return tmperr;
+ }
+
+ xfree (fname);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Callback function to try the unprotection from the passpharse query
+ code. */
+static int
+try_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
+{
+ struct try_unprotect_arg_s *arg = pi->check_cb_arg;
+ size_t dummy;
+
+ assert (!arg->unprotected_key);
+ return agent_unprotect (arg->protected_key, pi->pin,
+ &arg->unprotected_key, &dummy);
+}
+
+
+/* Unprotect the canconical encoded S-expression key in KEYBUF. GRIP
+ should be the hex encoded keygrip of that key to be used with the
+ caching mechanism. DESC_TEXT may be set to override the default
+ description used for the pinentry. */
+static int
+unprotect (CTRL ctrl, const char *desc_text,
+ unsigned char **keybuf, const unsigned char *grip, int ignore_cache)
+{
+ struct pin_entry_info_s *pi;
+ struct try_unprotect_arg_s arg;
+ int rc, i;
+ unsigned char *result;
+ size_t resultlen;
+ char hexgrip[40+1];
+
+ for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+ sprintf (hexgrip+2*i, "%02X", grip[i]);
+ hexgrip[40] = 0;
+
+ /* First try to get it from the cache - if there is none or we can't
+ unprotect it, we fall back to ask the user */
+ if (!ignore_cache)
+ {
+ void *cache_marker;
+ const char *pw = agent_get_cache (hexgrip, &cache_marker);
+ if (pw)
+ {
+ rc = agent_unprotect (*keybuf, pw, &result, &resultlen);
+ agent_unlock_cache_entry (&cache_marker);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ xfree (*keybuf);
+ *keybuf = result;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pi = gcry_calloc_secure (1, sizeof (*pi) + 100);
+ pi->max_length = 100;
+ pi->min_digits = 0; /* we want a real passphrase */
+ pi->max_digits = 8;
+ pi->max_tries = 3;
+ pi->check_cb = try_unprotect_cb;
+ arg.protected_key = *keybuf;
+ arg.unprotected_key = NULL;
+ pi->check_cb_arg = &arg;
+
+ rc = agent_askpin (ctrl, desc_text, NULL, pi);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ assert (arg.unprotected_key);
+ agent_put_cache (hexgrip, pi->pin, 0);
+ xfree (*keybuf);
+ *keybuf = arg.unprotected_key;
+ }
+ xfree (pi);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp in RESULT after locating it using
+ the grip. Returns NULL in RESULT if the operation should be
+ diverted to a token; SHADOW_INFO will point then to an allocated
+ S-Expression with the shadow_info part from the file. With
+ IGNORE_CACHE passed as true the passphrase is not taken from the
+ cache. DESC_TEXT may be set to present a custom description for the
+ pinentry. */
+gpg_error_t
+agent_key_from_file (CTRL ctrl, const char *desc_text,
+ const unsigned char *grip, unsigned char **shadow_info,
+ int ignore_cache, gcry_sexp_t *result)
{
int i, rc;
char *fname;
FILE *fp;
struct stat st;
- char *buf;
- size_t buflen, erroff;
- GCRY_SEXP s_skey;
- char hexgrip[41];
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len, buflen, erroff;
+ gcry_sexp_t s_skey;
+ char hexgrip[40+4+1];
+ int got_shadow_info = 0;
+ *result = NULL;
+ if (shadow_info)
+ *shadow_info = NULL;
+
for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
sprintf (hexgrip+2*i, "%02X", grip[i]);
- hexgrip[40] = 0;
+ strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
- fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, "private-keys-v1.d", hexgrip, NULL );
+ fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL);
fp = fopen (fname, "rb");
if (!fp)
{
+ rc = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
log_error ("can't open `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
- return NULL;
+ return rc;
}
if (fstat (fileno(fp), &st))
{
+ rc = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
log_error ("can't stat `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
fclose (fp);
- return NULL;
+ return rc;
}
buflen = st.st_size;
buf = xmalloc (buflen+1);
if (fread (buf, buflen, 1, fp) != 1)
{
+ rc = gpg_error_from_errno (errno);
log_error ("error reading `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror (errno));
xfree (fname);
fclose (fp);
xfree (buf);
- return NULL;
+ return rc;
}
rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, buf, buflen);
if (rc)
{
log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n",
- (unsigned int)erroff, gcry_strerror (rc));
- return NULL;
+ (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
+ return rc;
+ }
+ len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_skey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, NULL, 0);
+ assert (len);
+ buf = xtrymalloc (len);
+ if (!buf)
+ {
+ rc = out_of_core ();
+ gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
+ return rc;
}
+ len = gcry_sexp_sprint (s_skey, GCRYSEXP_FMT_CANON, buf, len);
+ assert (len);
+ gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
- return s_skey;
+ switch (agent_private_key_type (buf))
+ {
+ case PRIVATE_KEY_CLEAR:
+ break; /* no unprotection needed */
+ case PRIVATE_KEY_PROTECTED:
+ rc = unprotect (ctrl, desc_text, &buf, grip, ignore_cache);
+ if (rc)
+ log_error ("failed to unprotect the secret key: %s\n",
+ gpg_strerror (rc));
+ break;
+ case PRIVATE_KEY_SHADOWED:
+ if (shadow_info)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *s;
+ size_t n;
+
+ rc = agent_get_shadow_info (buf, &s);
+ if (!rc)
+ {
+ n = gcry_sexp_canon_len (s, 0, NULL,NULL);
+ assert (n);
+ *shadow_info = xtrymalloc (n);
+ if (!*shadow_info)
+ rc = out_of_core ();
+ else
+ {
+ memcpy (*shadow_info, s, n);
+ rc = 0;
+ got_shadow_info = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ log_error ("get_shadow_info failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
+ }
+ else
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_SECKEY);
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_error ("invalid private key format\n");
+ rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rc || got_shadow_info)
+ {
+ xfree (buf);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ buflen = gcry_sexp_canon_len (buf, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ rc = gcry_sexp_sscan (&s_skey, &erroff, buf, buflen);
+ wipememory (buf, buflen);
+ xfree (buf);
+ if (rc)
+ {
+ log_error ("failed to build S-Exp (off=%u): %s\n",
+ (unsigned int)erroff, gpg_strerror (rc));
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ *result = s_skey;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return the secret key as an S-Exp after locating it using the grip.
+ Returns NULL if key is not available. 0 = key is available */
+int
+agent_key_available (const unsigned char *grip)
+{
+ int i;
+ char *fname;
+ char hexgrip[40+4+1];
+
+ for (i=0; i < 20; i++)
+ sprintf (hexgrip+2*i, "%02X", grip[i]);
+ strcpy (hexgrip+40, ".key");
+
+ fname = make_filename (opt.homedir, GNUPG_PRIVATE_KEYS_DIR, hexgrip, NULL);
+ i = !access (fname, R_OK)? 0 : -1;
+ xfree (fname);
+ return i;
}
+
+