* options.h, getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_subkey), gpg.c (main), sig-check.c
[gnupg.git] / g10 / mainproc.c
index 09c35db..7c13921 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* mainproc.c - handle packets
- *     Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004,
+ *               2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -15,7 +16,8 @@
  *
  * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301,
+ * USA.
  */
 
 #include <config.h>
 #include <assert.h>
 #include <time.h>
 
-#include <gcrypt.h>
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "iobuf.h"
+#include "memory.h"
 #include "options.h"
 #include "util.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
 #include "keydb.h"
 #include "filter.h"
 #include "main.h"
 #include "status.h"
 #include "i18n.h"
 #include "trustdb.h"
-#include "hkp.h"
+#include "keyserver-internal.h"
+#include "photoid.h"
 
 
 struct kidlist_item {
@@ -47,7 +51,6 @@ struct kidlist_item {
 };
 
 
-
 /****************
  * Structure to hold the context
  */
@@ -68,9 +71,12 @@ struct mainproc_context {
     int have_data;
     IOBUF iobuf;    /* used to get the filename etc. */
     int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */
-    ulong local_id;    /* ditto */
-    struct kidlist_item *failed_pkenc; /* list of packets for which
-                                          we do not have a secret key */
+    ulong symkeys;
+    struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list;   /* list of encryption packets */
+    struct {
+        int op;
+        int stop_now;
+    } pipemode;
 };
 
 
@@ -87,13 +93,18 @@ release_list( CTX c )
        return;
     proc_tree(c, c->list );
     release_kbnode( c->list );
-    while( c->failed_pkenc ) {
-       struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->failed_pkenc->next;
-       gcry_free( c->failed_pkenc );
-       c->failed_pkenc = tmp;
+    while( c->pkenc_list ) {
+       struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
+       xfree( c->pkenc_list );
+       c->pkenc_list = tmp;
     }
-    c->failed_pkenc = NULL;
+    c->pkenc_list = NULL;
     c->list = NULL;
+    c->have_data = 0;
+    c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+    c->pipemode.op = 0;
+    c->pipemode.stop_now = 0;
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
 }
 
 
@@ -103,8 +114,14 @@ add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     KBNODE node;
 
     if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */
-       if( c->list->pkt->pkttype != PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
-          log_error("add_onepass_sig: another packet is in the way\n");
+        /* We can only append another onepass packet if the list
+         * does contain only onepass packets */
+        for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG;
+             node = node->next )
+            ;
+       if( node ) {
+            /* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and 
+             * allow this packet to start a new verification thing */
           release_list( c );
           c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
        }
@@ -118,6 +135,48 @@ add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 }
 
 
+static int
+add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+{
+    if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* New clear text signature.
+         * Process the last one and reset everything */
+        release_list(c);
+    }   
+    else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) {
+        /* Pipemode control packet */
+        if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n");
+        if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) {
+            /* start the whole thing */
+            assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */
+            assert ( !c->pipemode.op );
+            c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1];
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) {
+            /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+        }
+        else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) {
+            assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' );
+            release_list (c);
+            /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */
+            c->pipemode.stop_now = 1;
+        }
+        else 
+            log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n");
+        return 0; /* no need to store the packet */
+    }   
+
+    if( c->list )  /* add another packet */
+        add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ));
+    else /* insert the first one */
+       c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
 
 static int
 add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
@@ -180,6 +239,45 @@ add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     return 1;
 }
 
+static int
+symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen )
+{
+  CIPHER_HANDLE hd;
+
+  if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
+    {
+      log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
+                 (int)slen);
+      return G10ERR_BAD_KEY;
+    }
+
+  hd = cipher_open( dek->algo, CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1 );
+  cipher_setkey( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+  cipher_setiv( hd, NULL, 0 );
+  cipher_decrypt( hd, seskey, seskey, slen );
+  cipher_close( hd );
+
+  /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
+     decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
+
+  dek->keylen=slen-1;
+  dek->algo=seskey[0];
+
+  if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
+    BUG ();
+
+  /* This is not completely accurate, since a bad passphrase may have
+     resulted in a garbage algorithm byte, but it's close enough since
+     a bogus byte here will fail later. */
+  if(dek->algo==CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)
+    idea_cipher_warn(0);
+
+  memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
+
+  /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
+
+  return 0;
+}   
 
 static void
 proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
@@ -187,12 +285,93 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     PKT_symkey_enc *enc;
 
     enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
-    if( enc->seskeylen )
-       log_error( "symkey_enc packet with session keys are not supported!\n");
-    else {
+    if (!enc)
+        log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
+    else if(!c->dek)
+      {
+        int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
+       const char *s = cipher_algo_to_string (algo);
+
+       if(s)
+         {
+           if(!opt.quiet)
+             {
+               if(enc->seskeylen)
+                 log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
+               else
+                 log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
+             }
+         }
+       else
+         log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo );
+
+       if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo))
+         {
+           log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
+                       " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
+           s=NULL;
+         }
+
        c->last_was_session_key = 2;
-       c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, enc->cipher_algo, &enc->s2k, 0 );
-    }
+       if(!s || opt.list_only)
+         goto leave;
+
+       if(opt.override_session_key)
+         {
+           c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+           if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
+             {
+               xfree(c->dek);
+               c->dek = NULL;
+             }
+         }
+       else
+         {
+            int canceled;
+
+           c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0,
+                                        NULL, &canceled);
+            if (canceled)
+              {
+                /* For unknown reasons passphrase_to_dek does only
+                   return NULL if a new passphrase has been requested
+                   and has not been repeated correctly.  Thus even
+                   with a cancel requested (by means of the gpg-agent)
+                   it won't return NULL but an empty passphrase.  We
+                   take the most conservative approach for now and
+                   work around it right here. */
+                xfree (c->dek);
+                c->dek = NULL;
+              }
+
+           if(c->dek)
+             {
+               c->dek->symmetric=1;
+
+               /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
+                  key comes before a public key in the message - if
+                  the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
+                  a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
+                  to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+                  appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+                  come later. */
+               if(enc->seskeylen)
+                 {
+                   if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
+                                            enc->seskeylen))
+                     {
+                       xfree(c->dek);
+                       c->dek=NULL;
+                     }
+                 }
+               else
+                 c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+             }
+         }
+      }
+
+ leave:
+    c->symkeys++;
     free_packet(pkt);
 }
 
@@ -209,7 +388,7 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
      * function to check it. */
     if( opt.verbose )
-       log_info(_("public key is %08lX\n"), (ulong)enc->keyid[1] );
+       log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) );
 
     if( is_status_enabled() ) {
        char buf[50];
@@ -218,43 +397,55 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
        write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf );
     }
 
-
-    if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
-       || enc->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_DSA
+    if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) {
+       /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
+        * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
+        * command line and the GCHQ knows about it */
+       c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+       result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key );
+       if ( result ) {
+           xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+       }
+    }
+    else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo)
+       || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
        || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo)  ) {
        if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
+                          || opt.try_all_secrets
                          || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) {
            if( opt.list_only )
                result = -1;
            else {
-               c->dek = gcry_xmalloc_secure( sizeof *c->dek );
+               c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
                if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) {
                    /* error: delete the DEK */
-                   gcry_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
+                   xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
                }
            }
        }
        else
-           result = GPGERR_NO_SECKEY;
+           result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
     }
     else
-       result = GPGERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+       result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
 
     if( result == -1 )
        ;
-    else if( !result ) {
-       if( opt.verbose > 1 )
-           log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
-    }
-    else { /* store it for later display */
-       struct kidlist_item *x = gcry_xmalloc( sizeof *x );
+    else
+      {
+        /* store it for later display */
+       struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x );
        x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
        x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
        x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
        x->reason = result;
-       x->next = c->failed_pkenc;
-       c->failed_pkenc = x;
-    }
+       x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+       c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+        if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
+         log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
+      }
+
     free_packet(pkt);
 }
 
@@ -265,35 +456,40 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
  * not decrypt.
  */
 static void
-print_failed_pkenc( struct kidlist_item *list )
+print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed )
 {
     for( ; list; list = list->next ) {
-       PKT_public_key *pk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *pk );
-       const char *algstr = gcry_pk_algo_name( list->pubkey_algo );
+       PKT_public_key *pk;
+       const char *algstr;
+        
+        if ( failed && !list->reason )
+            continue;
+        if ( !failed && list->reason )
+            continue;
+
+        algstr = pubkey_algo_to_string( list->pubkey_algo );
+        pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
 
        if( !algstr )
            algstr = "[?]";
        pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
-       if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) {
-           size_t n;
+       if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) )
+         {
            char *p;
-           log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %08lX, created %s\n"),
-                      nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, (ulong)list->kid[1],
-                      strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
-           fputs("      \"", log_stream() );
-           p = get_user_id( list->kid, &n );
-           print_string( log_stream(), p, n, '"' );
-           gcry_free(p);
-           fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
-       }
-       else {
-           log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %08lX\n"),
-                       algstr, (ulong) list->kid[1] );
-       }
+           log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
+                     nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
+                     strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) );
+           p=get_user_id_native(list->kid);
+           fprintf(log_stream(),_("      \"%s\"\n"),p);
+           xfree(p);
+         }
+       else
+         log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
+                  algstr,keystr(list->kid));
+
        free_public_key( pk );
 
-       if( list->reason == GPGERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
-           log_info(_("no secret key for decryption available\n"));
+       if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) {
            if( is_status_enabled() ) {
                char buf[20];
                sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0],
@@ -301,9 +497,9 @@ print_failed_pkenc( struct kidlist_item *list )
                write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf );
            }
        }
-       else
-           log_error(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
-                                               gpg_errstr(list->reason));
+       else if (list->reason)
+           log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
+                                               g10_errstr(list->reason));
     }
 }
 
@@ -313,7 +509,15 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 {
     int result = 0;
 
-    print_failed_pkenc( c->failed_pkenc );
+    if (!opt.quiet)
+      {
+       if(c->symkeys>1)
+         log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys);
+       else if(c->symkeys==1)
+         log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
+        print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
+      }
 
     write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION );
 
@@ -321,45 +525,97 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     if( opt.list_only )
        result = -1;
     else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) {
-       /* assume this is old conventional encrypted data
-        * Actually we should use IDEA and MD5 in this case, but because
-        * IDEA is patented we can't do so */
-       c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0,
-                   opt.def_cipher_algo ? opt.def_cipher_algo
-                                       : DEFAULT_CIPHER_ALGO, NULL, 0 );
+        int algo;
+        STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
+
+       if(opt.override_session_key)
+         {
+           c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+           result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+           if(result)
+             {
+               xfree(c->dek);
+               c->dek = NULL;
+             }
+         }
+       else
+         {
+           /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
+           if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
+             log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+                        cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+           else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
+             {
+               algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+               if (!algo)
+                 algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+               idea_cipher_warn(1);
+               log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+                           "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+                         cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+             }
+           else
+             {
+               algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+               if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+                 {
+                   /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
+                   s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+                   s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+                   s2k = &s2kbuf;
+                 }
+               log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+             }
+
+           c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
+           if (c->dek)
+             c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+         }
     }
     else if( !c->dek )
-       result = GPGERR_NO_SECKEY;
+       result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
     if( !result )
        result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
 
-    gcry_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
     if( result == -1 )
        ;
-    else if( !result ) {
+    else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
        write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
        if( opt.verbose > 1 )
            log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
-       if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method )
+       if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result )
            write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
+       else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
+           log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+       if(opt.show_session_key)
+         {
+           int i;
+           char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
+           sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
+           for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
+             sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
+           log_info( "session key: `%s'\n", buf );
+           write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
+         }
     }
-    else if( result == GPGERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+    else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
        log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
        write_status( STATUS_BADMDC );
+       write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
     }
     else {
        write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED );
-       log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(result));
+       log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result));
        /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
         * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
     }
+    xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
     free_packet(pkt);
     c->last_was_session_key = 0;
     write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
 }
 
 
-
 static void
 proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 {
@@ -372,9 +628,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     else if( opt.verbose )
        log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
     free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
-    c->mfx.md = gcry_md_open( 0, 0);
-    if( !c->mfx.md )
-       BUG();
+    c->mfx.md = md_open( 0, 0);
     /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
      * and no armoring - Not yet tested
      * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
@@ -382,66 +636,98 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
      * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
      */
     any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0;
-    for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) {
-       if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) {
-           if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) {
-               gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
+    for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
+      {
+       if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG )
+         {
+           /* For the onepass signature case */
+           if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo )
+             {
+               md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo );
                if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo
-                                                     == GCRY_MD_MD5 )
-                   only_md5 = 1;
+                   == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 )
+                 only_md5 = 1;
                else
-                   only_md5 = 0;
+                 only_md5 = 0;
                any = 1;
-           }
+             }
            if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
-               only_md5 = 0;
-
-           /* Check whether this is a cleartext signature.  We assume that
-            * we have one if the sig_class is 1 and the keyid is 0, that
-            * are the faked packets produced by armor.c.  There is a
-            * possibility that this fails, but there is no other easy way
-            * to do it. (We could use a special packet type to indicate
-            * this, but this may also be faked - it simply can't be verified
-            * and is _no_ security issue)
-            */
-           if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01
-               && !n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->keyid[0]
-               && !n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->keyid[1] )
-               clearsig = 1;
-       }
-    }
-
-    if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) {
-       /* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */
-       gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, GCRY_MD_RMD160 );
-       gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, GCRY_MD_SHA1 );
-       gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, GCRY_MD_MD5 );
-    }
+             only_md5 = 0;
+         }
+       else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
+         {
+           /* For the clearsigned message case */
+            size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
+            const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
+
+            /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */
+            if ( datalen < 2 )
+             log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); 
+            /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
+             * documents */
+            clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
+            for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ )
+             md_enable( c->mfx.md, *data );
+            any = 1;
+            break;  /* no pass signature packets are expected */
+         }
+       else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE)
+         {
+           /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
+           md_enable( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
+           any=1;
+         }
+      }
+
+    if( !any && !opt.skip_verify )
+      {
+       /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case.  It's not legal
+          according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that
+          often.  There is no good way to specify what algorithms to
+          use in that case, so these three are the historical
+          answer. */
+       md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+       md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+       md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
+      }
     if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) {
        /* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2.  It does only
         * catch those mails which are armored.  To catch the non-armored
         * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet
         * in front of the plaintext.  If someone needs this, send me a patch.
         */
-       c->mfx.md2 = gcry_md_open( GCRY_MD_MD5, 0);
-       if( !c->mfx.md2 )
-           BUG();
+       c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0);
     }
     if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
-       gcry_md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+       md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
        if ( c->mfx.md2  )
-           gcry_md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+           md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
     }
-    rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
-    if( rc == GPGERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
-       /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
-        * check the signature */
-       rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+    if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0 );
+    else {
+        rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
+        if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
+            /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
+             * check the signature */
+            rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
+        }
     }
     if( rc )
-       log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc));
+       log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
     free_packet(pkt);
     c->last_was_session_key = 0;
+
+    /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
+     * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences.
+     */
+    n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
+    if (c->list)
+        add_kbnode (c->list, n);
+    else 
+        c->list = n;
 }
 
 
@@ -472,7 +758,7 @@ proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     else
        rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL );
     if( rc )
-       log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc));
+       log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
     free_packet(pkt);
     c->last_was_session_key = 0;
 }
@@ -482,10 +768,11 @@ proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
  * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
  */
 static int
-do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
+do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig,
+             int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey )
 {
     PKT_signature *sig;
-    GCRY_MD_HD md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
+    MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL;
     int algo, rc;
 
     assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
@@ -494,42 +781,35 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
     sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
 
     algo = sig->digest_algo;
-    if( (rc=openpgp_md_test_algo(algo)) )
+    if( (rc=check_digest_algo(algo)) )
        return rc;
 
     if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) {
        if( c->mfx.md )
-           md = gcry_md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+           md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
        else /* detached signature */
-           md = gcry_md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
-       if( !md )
-           BUG();
+           md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
     }
     else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
        /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
         * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
        if( c->mfx.md ) {
-           md = gcry_md_copy( c->mfx.md );
-           if( !md )
-               BUG();
-           if( c->mfx.md2 ) {
-               md2 = gcry_md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
-               if( !md2 )
-                   BUG();
-           }
+           md = md_copy( c->mfx.md );
+           if( c->mfx.md2 )
+              md2 = md_copy( c->mfx.md2 );
        }
        else { /* detached signature */
-           log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
-           md =  gcry_md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
-           md2 = gcry_md_open( 0, 0 );
-           if( !md || !md2 )
-               BUG();
+         log_debug("Do we really need this here?");
+           md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
+           md2 = md_open( 0, 0 );
        }
     }
     else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
             || sig->sig_class == 0x18
+             || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
             || sig->sig_class == 0x20
-            || sig->sig_class == 0x30  ) { /* classes 0x10..0x17,0x20,0x30 */
+            || sig->sig_class == 0x28
+            || sig->sig_class == 0x30  ) { 
        if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
            || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
            return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
@@ -537,21 +817,21 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
        else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
            log_info(_("standalone revocation - "
                       "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
-           return GPGERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
+           return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
        }
        else {
            log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n",
                                                        sig->sig_class);
-           return GPGERR_SIG_CLASS;
+           return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
        }
     }
     else
-       return GPGERR_SIG_CLASS;
-    rc = signature_check( sig, md );
-    if( rc == GPGERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
-       rc = signature_check( sig, md2 );
-    gcry_md_close(md);
-    gcry_md_close(md2);
+       return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+    rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    if( rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && md2 )
+       rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL );
+    md_close(md);
+    md_close(md2);
 
     return rc;
 }
@@ -567,92 +847,21 @@ print_userid( PACKET *pkt )
        return;
     }
     if( opt.with_colons )
-       print_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
-                               pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
+      {
+       if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+         printf("%u %lu",
+                pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
+                pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
+       else
+         print_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                       pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':');
+      }
     else
        print_utf8_string( stdout,  pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
                                     pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
 }
 
 
-static void
-print_fingerprint( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk )
-{
-    byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
-    size_t i, n;
-
-    if( sk )
-       fingerprint_from_sk( sk, array, &n );
-    else
-       fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
-    p = array;
-    if( opt.with_colons ) {
-       printf("fpr:::::::::");
-       for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
-           printf("%02X", *p );
-       putchar(':');
-    }
-    else {
-       printf("     Key fingerprint =");
-       if( n == 20 ) {
-           for(i=0; i < n ; i++, i++, p += 2 ) {
-               if( i == 10 )
-                   putchar(' ');
-               printf(" %02X%02X", *p, p[1] );
-           }
-       }
-       else {
-           for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ ) {
-               if( i && !(i%8) )
-                   putchar(' ');
-               printf(" %02X", *p );
-           }
-       }
-    }
-    putchar('\n');
-}
-
-static void
-print_notation_data( PKT_signature *sig )
-{
-    size_t n, n1, n2;
-    const byte *p;
-    int seq = 0;
-
-    while( (p = enum_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,
-                                &n, &seq )) ) {
-       if( n < 8 ) {
-           log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
-           return;
-       }
-       if( !(*p & 0x80) )
-           return; /* not human readable */
-       n1 = (p[4] << 8) | p[5];
-       n2 = (p[6] << 8) | p[7];
-       p += 8;
-       if( 8+n1+n2 != n ) {
-           log_info(_("WARNING: invalid notation data found\n"));
-           return;
-       }
-       log_info(_("Notation: ") );
-       print_string( log_stream(), p, n1, 0 );
-       putc( '=', log_stream() );
-       print_string( log_stream(), p+n1, n2, 0 );
-       putc( '\n', log_stream() );
-    }
-    if( (p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, SIGSUBPKT_POLICY, &n ) )) {
-       log_info(_("Policy: ") );
-       print_string( log_stream(), p, n, 0 );
-       putc( '\n', log_stream() );
-    }
-
-    /* Now check wheter the key of this signature has some
-     * notation data */
-
-    /* TODO */
-}
-
-
 /****************
  * List the certificate in a user friendly way
  */
@@ -669,44 +878,38 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
             || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
        PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
 
-       if( opt.with_colons ) {
+       if( opt.with_colons )
+         {
            u32 keyid[2];
            keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
-           if( mainkey ) {
-               c->local_id = pk->local_id;
-               c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
-                                          0 : query_trust_info( pk, NULL );
-           }
+           if( mainkey )
+             c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode?
+               0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL );
            printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
            if( c->trustletter )
-               putchar( c->trustletter );
-           printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:",
-                   nbits_from_pk( pk ),
-                   pk->pubkey_algo,
-                   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
-                   datestr_from_pk( pk ),
-                   pk->expiredate? strtimestamp(pk->expiredate):"" );
-           if( c->local_id )
-               printf("%lu", c->local_id );
-           putchar(':');
-           if( c->local_id && !opt.fast_list_mode )
-               putchar( get_ownertrust_info( c->local_id ) );
+             putchar( c->trustletter );
+           printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
+                  nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+                  pk->pubkey_algo,
+                  (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+                  colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
+                  colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
+           if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode )
+             putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) );
            putchar(':');
            if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) {
-               putchar('\n'); any=1;
-               if( opt.fingerprint )
-                   print_fingerprint( pk, NULL );
-               printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
-                           node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
+             putchar('\n'); any=1;
+             if( opt.fingerprint )
+               print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
+             printf("rtv:1:%u:\n",
+                    node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval );
            }
-       }
+         }
        else
-           printf("%s  %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
-                                     mainkey? "pub":"sub",
-                                     nbits_from_pk( pk ),
-                                     pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ),
-                                     (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL ),
-                                     datestr_from_pk( pk )     );
+         printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s%s",
+                mainkey? "pub":"sub", nbits_from_pk( pk ),
+                pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), keystr_from_pk( pk ),
+                datestr_from_pk( pk ), mainkey?" ":"");
 
        if( mainkey ) {
            /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
@@ -724,7 +927,8 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
                    if( any ) {
                        if( opt.with_colons )
-                           printf("uid:::::::::");
+                           printf("%s:::::::::",
+                             node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
                        else
                            printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
                    }
@@ -733,7 +937,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                        putchar(':');
                    putchar('\n');
                    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
-                       print_fingerprint( pk, NULL );
+                       print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
                    if( node->next
                        && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) {
                        printf("rtv:2:%u:\n",
@@ -750,38 +954,49 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                }
            }
        }
-       else if( pk->expiredate ) { /* of subkey */
-           printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) );
-       }
+       else
+         {
+           /* of subkey */
+           if( pk->is_revoked )
+             {
+               printf(" [");
+               printf(_("revoked: %s"),revokestr_from_pk(pk));
+               printf("]");
+             }
+           else if( pk->expiredate )
+             {
+               printf(" [");
+               printf(_("expires: %s"),expirestr_from_pk(pk));
+               printf("]");
+             }
+         }
 
        if( !any )
            putchar('\n');
        if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
-           print_fingerprint( pk, NULL );
+           print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 );
     }
     else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
             || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
        PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
 
-       if( opt.with_colons ) {
+       if( opt.with_colons )
+         {
            u32 keyid[2];
            keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid );
            printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::",
-                   mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
-                   nbits_from_sk( sk ),
-                   sk->pubkey_algo,
-                   (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
-                   datestr_from_sk( sk ),
-                   sk->expiredate? strtimestamp(sk->expiredate):""
-                   /* fixme: add LID */ );
-       }
+                  mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+                  nbits_from_sk( sk ),
+                  sk->pubkey_algo,
+                  (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
+                  colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ),
+                  colon_strtime (sk->expiredate)
+                  /* fixme: add LID */ );
+         }
        else
-           printf("%s  %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
-                                     mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
-                                     nbits_from_sk( sk ),
-                                     pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
-                                     (ulong)keyid_from_sk( sk, NULL ),
-                                     datestr_from_sk( sk )   );
+         printf("%s  %4u%c/%s %s ", mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+                nbits_from_sk( sk ), pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ),
+                keystr_from_sk( sk ), datestr_from_sk( sk ));
        if( mainkey ) {
            /* and now list all userids with their signatures */
            for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) {
@@ -798,7 +1013,8 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
                    if( any ) {
                        if( opt.with_colons )
-                           printf("uid:::::::::");
+                           printf("%s:::::::::",
+                             node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
                        else
                            printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
                    }
@@ -807,7 +1023,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                        putchar(':');
                    putchar('\n');
                    if( opt.fingerprint && !any )
-                       print_fingerprint( NULL, sk );
+                       print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
                    any=1;
                }
                else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
@@ -822,7 +1038,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
        if( !any )
            putchar('\n');
        if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 )
-           print_fingerprint( NULL, sk );
+           print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 );
     }
     else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE  ) {
        PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
@@ -832,7 +1048,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
        char *p;
        int sigrc = ' ';
 
-       if( !opt.list_sigs )
+       if( !opt.verbose )
            return;
 
        if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 )
@@ -841,10 +1057,11 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
            fputs("sig", stdout);
        if( opt.check_sigs ) {
            fflush(stdout);
-           switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig )) ) {
+           switch( (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL )) ) {
              case 0:                  sigrc = '!'; break;
-             case GPGERR_BAD_SIGN:    sigrc = '-'; break;
-             case GPGERR_NO_PUBKEY:   sigrc = '?'; break;
+             case G10ERR_BAD_SIGN:    sigrc = '-'; break;
+             case G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY: 
+             case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY:  sigrc = '?'; break;
              default:                 sigrc = '%'; break;
            }
        }
@@ -866,15 +1083,25 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
            putchar(':');
            if( sigrc != ' ' )
                putchar(sigrc);
-           printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s::::", sig->pubkey_algo,
-                                            (ulong)sig->keyid[0],
-                      (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
+           printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
+                  (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
+                  colon_datestr_from_sig(sig),
+                  colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig));
+
+           if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
+             printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
+           printf(":");
+
+           if(sig->trust_regexp)
+             print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp,
+                          strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':');
+           printf(":");
        }
        else
-           printf("%c       %08lX %s   ",
-                   sigrc, (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
+         printf("%c       %s %s   ",
+                sigrc, keystr(sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
        if( sigrc == '%' )
-           printf("[%s] ", gpg_errstr(rc2) );
+           printf("[%s] ", g10_errstr(rc2) );
        else if( sigrc == '?' )
            ;
        else if( is_selfsig ) {
@@ -887,10 +1114,10 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
        else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) {
            p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n );
            print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons );
-           gcry_free(p);
+           xfree(p);
        }
        if( opt.with_colons )
-           printf(":%02x:", sig->sig_class );
+           printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
        putchar('\n');
     }
     else
@@ -903,11 +1130,11 @@ int
 proc_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
 {
     int rc;
-    CTX c = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *c );
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
 
     c->anchor = anchor;
     rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
-    gcry_free( c );
+    xfree( c );
     return rc;
 }
 
@@ -917,7 +1144,7 @@ int
 proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
                        STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
 {
-    CTX c = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *c );
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
     int rc;
 
     c->anchor = anchor;
@@ -925,20 +1152,20 @@ proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a,
     c->signed_data = signedfiles;
     c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
     rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
-    gcry_free( c );
+    xfree( c );
     return rc;
 }
 
 int
 proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
 {
-    CTX c = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *c );
+    CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c );
     int rc;
 
     c->anchor = anchor;
     c->encrypt_only = 1;
     rc = do_proc_packets( c, a );
-    gcry_free( c );
+    xfree( c );
     return rc;
 }
 
@@ -946,7 +1173,7 @@ proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, IOBUF a )
 int
 do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
 {
-    PACKET *pkt = gcry_xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+    PACKET *pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
     int rc=0;
     int any_data=0;
     int newpkt;
@@ -957,7 +1184,9 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
        any_data = 1;
        if( rc ) {
            free_packet(pkt);
-           if( rc == GPGERR_INVALID_PACKET )
+            /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
+             * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
+           if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 )
                break;
            continue;
        }
@@ -981,12 +1210,14 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
              case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
              case PKT_ENCRYPTED:
              case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
-               rc = GPGERR_UNEXPECTED;
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+               rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
                goto leave;
              case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
              default: newpkt = 0; break;
            }
        }
@@ -995,7 +1226,8 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
              case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
              case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
              case PKT_USER_ID:
-               rc = GPGERR_UNEXPECTED;
+                write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
+               rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED;
                goto leave;
              case PKT_SIGNATURE:   newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:  proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
@@ -1005,6 +1237,7 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
              case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+             case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
              default: newpkt = 0; break;
            }
        }
@@ -1029,23 +1262,38 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
              case PKT_PLAINTEXT:   proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_COMPRESSED:  proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break;
              case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break;
+              case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
              case PKT_RING_TRUST:  newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break;
              default: newpkt = 0; break;
            }
        }
-       if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
+        /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
+         * I used it.  Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
+         * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
+         * packet and not to reuse the current one ...  It works right
+         * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
+         * an extra layer.
+         * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? 
+         */
+       if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC )
            c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT;
 
        if( newpkt == -1 )
            ;
        else if( newpkt ) {
-           pkt = gcry_xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
+           pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
            init_packet(pkt);
        }
        else
            free_packet(pkt);
+        if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) {
+            /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to 
+             * break the loop here */ 
+            rc = -1;
+            break;
+        }
     }
-    if( rc == GPGERR_INVALID_PACKET )
+    if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET )
        write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" );
     if( any_data )
        rc = 0;
@@ -1055,100 +1303,525 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
 
   leave:
     release_list( c );
-    gcry_free(c->dek);
+    xfree(c->dek);
     free_packet( pkt );
-    gcry_free( pkt );
+    xfree( pkt );
     free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
     return rc;
 }
 
 
+/* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
+   of the notation data. */
+static pka_info_t *
+get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  const unsigned char *p;
+  size_t len, n1, n2;
+  int seq = 0;
+  pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
+
+  while ((p = enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION,
+                               &len, &seq, NULL)))
+    {
+      if (len < 8)
+        continue; /* Notation packet is too short. */
+      n1 = (p[4]<<8)|p[5];
+      n2 = (p[6]<<8)|p[7];
+      if (8 + n1 + n2 != len)
+        continue; /* Length fields of notation packet are inconsistent. */
+      p += 8;
+      if (n1 != 21 || memcmp (p, "pka-address@gnupg.org", 21))
+        continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
+      p += n1;
+      if (n2 < 3)
+        continue; /* Impossible email address. */
+
+      if (pka)
+        break; /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In
+                  future we might want to keep additional PKA
+                  notations in a linked list. */
+
+      pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + n2);
+      pka->valid = 0;
+      pka->checked = 0;
+      pka->uri = NULL;
+      memcpy (pka->email, p, n2);
+      pka->email[n2] = 0;
+
+      if (!is_valid_mailbox (pka->email))
+        {
+          /* We don't accept invalid mail addresses. */
+          xfree (pka);
+          pka = NULL;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return pka;
+}
+
+
+/* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record.  If this record has already
+   be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
+   out and try to get that DNS record. */
+static const char *
+pka_uri_from_sig (PKT_signature *sig)
+{
+  if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
+    {
+      assert (!sig->pka_info);
+      sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
+      sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
+      if (sig->pka_info)
+        {
+          char *uri;
+
+          uri = get_pka_info (sig->pka_info->email, sig->pka_info->fpr);
+          if (uri)
+            {
+              sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
+              if (!*uri)
+                xfree (uri);
+              else
+                sig->pka_info->uri = uri;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+  return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
+}
+
+
 static int
 check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 {
     PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
-    const char *astr, *tstr;
-    int rc;
+    const char *astr;
+    int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0;
 
     if( opt.skip_verify ) {
        log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
        return 0;
     }
 
-    tstr = asctimestamp(sig->timestamp);
-    astr = gcry_pk_algo_name( sig->pubkey_algo );
-    log_info(_("Signature made %.*s using %s key ID %08lX\n"),
-           (int)strlen(tstr), tstr, astr? astr: "?", (ulong)sig->keyid[1] );
-
-    rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL );
-    if( rc == GPGERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver_name && opt.auto_key_retrieve) {
-       if( !hkp_ask_import( sig->keyid ) )
-           rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL );
+    /* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures:
+     * PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet
+     * sequence: sig+data,  OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG
+     * sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig.
+     * Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with
+     * different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might
+     * not be possible to get it right:  let's say we have:
+     * data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last
+     * data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then 
+     * data+sig.
+     * To protect against this we check that all signatures follow
+     * without any intermediate packets.  Note, that we won't get this
+     * error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because
+     * we reset the list every time
+     *
+     * FIXME: Now that we have these marker packets, we should create a 
+     * real grammar and check against this.
+     */
+    {
+        KBNODE n;
+        int n_sig=0;
+
+        for (n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
+            if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) 
+                n_sig++;
+        }
+        if (n_sig > 1) { /* more than one signature - check sequence */
+            int tmp, onepass;
+
+            for (tmp=onepass=0,n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) {
+                if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) 
+                    onepass++;
+                else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                         && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                            == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+                    onepass++; /* handle the same way as a onepass */
+                }
+                else if ( (tmp && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) ) {
+                    log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
+                    return 0;
+                }
+                else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) 
+                    tmp = 1;
+                else if (!tmp && !onepass 
+                         && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+                         && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                            == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
+                    /* plaintext before signatures but no one-pass packets*/
+                    log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n"));
+                    return 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
     }
-    if( !rc || rc == GPGERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
+
+    astr = pubkey_algo_to_string( sig->pubkey_algo );
+    if(keystrlen()>8)
+      {
+       log_info(_("Signature made %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
+       log_info(_("               using %s key %s\n"),
+                astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
+      }
+    else
+      log_info(_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
+              asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
+              keystr(sig->keyid));
+
+    rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+
+    /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
+
+    if(rc==G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
+      {
+       const byte *p;
+       int seq=0;
+       size_t n;
+
+       while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
+         {
+           /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English
+              grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web
+              page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver.  I'm
+              not going to even try to make two strings here :) */
+           log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
+           print_utf8_string( log_stream(), p, n );
+           putc( '\n', log_stream() );
+
+           if(opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
+              && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
+             {
+               struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+
+               spec=parse_preferred_keyserver(sig);
+               if(spec)
+                 {
+                   int res;
+
+                   glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+                   res=keyserver_import_keyid(sig->keyid,spec);
+                   glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                   if(!res)
+                     rc=do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+                   free_keyserver_spec(spec);
+
+                   if(!rc)
+                     break;
+                 }
+             }
+         }
+      }
+
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
+       try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
+    if ( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY 
+         && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_PKA_RETRIEVE))
+      {
+        const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (sig);
+        
+        if (uri)
+          {
+            /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
+               fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
+            int res;
+            struct keyserver_spec *spec;
+            
+            spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 0, NULL, 0);
+            if (spec)
+              {
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+                res = keyserver_import_keyid (sig->keyid, spec);
+                glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+                free_keyserver_spec (spec);
+                if (!res)
+                  rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+              }
+          }
+      }
+
+
+    /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
+       no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
+
+    if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY && opt.keyserver
+       && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
+      {
+       int res;
+
+       glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
+       res=keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
+       glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
+       if(!res)
+         rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
+      }
+
+    if( !rc || rc == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
        KBNODE un, keyblock;
-       char *us;
-       int count=0;
+       int count=0, statno;
+        char keyid_str[50];
+       PKT_public_key *pk=NULL;
+
+       if(rc)
+         statno=STATUS_BADSIG;
+       else if(sig->flags.expired)
+         statno=STATUS_EXPSIG;
+       else if(is_expkey)
+         statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
+       else if(is_revkey)
+         statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
+       else
+         statno=STATUS_GOODSIG;
 
        keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid );
 
-       us = get_long_user_id_string( sig->keyid );
-       write_status_text( rc? STATUS_BADSIG : STATUS_GOODSIG, us );
-       gcry_free(us);
+        sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
+                 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
 
-       /* fixme: list only user ids which are valid and add information
-        *        about the trustworthiness of each user id, sort them.
-        *        Integrate this with check_signatures_trust(). */
+        /* find and print the primary user ID */
        for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+           char *p;
+           int valid;
+           if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
+             {
+               pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+               continue;
+             }
            if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
                continue;
-           if( !count++ )
-               log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
-                          : _("Good signature from \""));
+           if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created )
+               continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked )
+                continue;
+            if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired )
+                continue;
+           if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary )
+               continue;
+           /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
+           if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+               continue;
+
+           assert(pk);
+
+           /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting
+              the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb"
+              line. */
+           valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
+
+            keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                          un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+           p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                            un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+
+           if(rc)
+             log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+           else if(sig->flags.expired)
+             log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
            else
-               log_info(    _("                aka \""));
-           print_utf8_string( log_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
-                                            un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
-           fputs("\"\n", log_stream() );
-           if( rc )
-               break; /* print only one id in this case */
+             log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+
+           xfree(p);
+
+           if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+             fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
+           else
+             fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            count++;
        }
-       if( !count ) {  /* just in case that we have no userid */
-           log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"")
-                      : _("Good signature from \""));
-           fputs("[?]\"\n", log_stream() );
+       if( !count ) {  /* just in case that we have no valid textual
+                           userid */
+           char *p;
+
+           /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+                   !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                    break;
+            }
+
+           /* Try for any userid at all */
+           if(!un) {
+               for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                    if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+                        break;
+               }
+           }
+
+            if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
+                keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
+
+            write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
+                                          un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, 
+                                          -1 );
+
+           if(un)
+             p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                               un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+           else
+             p=xstrdup("[?]");
+
+           if(rc)
+             log_info(_("BAD signature from \"%s\""),p);
+           else if(sig->flags.expired)
+             log_info(_("Expired signature from \"%s\""),p);
+           else
+             log_info(_("Good signature from \"%s\""),p);
+            if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un)
+             {
+                putc(' ', log_stream() );
+                fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_stream() );
+             }
+           fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+       }
+
+        /* If we have a good signature and already printed 
+         * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
+        if ( count && !rc ) {
+           char *p;
+            for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) {
+                if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID )
+                    continue;
+                if((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
+                   || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+                  && !(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
+                 continue;
+               /* Only skip textual primaries */
+                if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary &&
+                    !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
+                   continue;
+
+               if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+                 {
+                   dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL);
+
+                   if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
+                     show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
+                                 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL);
+                 }
+
+               p=utf8_to_native(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+                                un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
+               log_info(_("                aka \"%s\""),p);
+               xfree(p);
+
+               if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)
+                 {
+                   const char *valid;
+                   if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
+                     valid=_("revoked");
+                   else if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
+                     valid=_("expired");
+                   else
+                     valid=trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk,
+                                                              un->pkt->
+                                                              pkt.user_id));
+                   fprintf(log_stream()," [%s]\n",valid);
+                 }
+               else
+                 fputs("\n", log_stream() );
+            }
        }
        release_kbnode( keyblock );
+
        if( !rc )
-           print_notation_data( sig );
+         {
+           if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS)
+             show_policy_url(sig,0,1);
+           else
+             show_policy_url(sig,0,2);
+
+           if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS)
+             show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1);
+           else
+             show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2);
+
+           if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS)
+             show_notation(sig,0,1,
+                       ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)+
+                       ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0));
+           else
+             show_notation(sig,0,2,0);
+         }
 
        if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
            /* print a status response with the fingerprint */
-           PKT_public_key *pk = gcry_xcalloc( 1, sizeof *pk );
+           PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
 
-           if( !get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) ) {
+           if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) {
                byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
-               char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+61];
+               char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
                size_t i, n;
 
-               fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
+                bufp = buf;
+               fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+               p = array;
+               for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
+               /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
+                  with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
+                  etc.).  Remember to make the buffer larger to
+                  match! */
+               sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
+                        strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
+                        (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
+                       sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
+                       sig->sig_class);
+                bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
+                if (!vpk->is_primary) {
+                   u32 akid[2];
+                   akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
+                   akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
+                   free_public_key (vpk);
+                   vpk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *vpk );
+                   if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) {
+                     /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
+                     n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
+                     memset (array, 0, n);
+                   }
+                   else
+                     fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
+                }
                p = array;
-               for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
-                   sprintf(buf+2*i, "%02X", *p );
-               sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), " %s %lu",
-                                        strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
-                                        (ulong)sig->timestamp );
+               for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
+                    sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
                write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
            }
-           free_public_key( pk );
+           free_public_key( vpk );
        }
 
-       if( !rc )
+       if (!rc)
+          {
+            pka_uri_from_sig (sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
            rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
+          }
+
+       if(sig->flags.expired)
+         {
+           log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"),
+                    asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+           rc=G10ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */
+         }
+       else if(sig->expiredate)
+         log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
+
+       if(opt.verbose)
+         log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"),
+                  sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
+                  sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
+                  digest_algo_to_string(sig->digest_algo));
+
        if( rc )
-           gpg_errors_seen = 1;
+           g10_errors_seen = 1;
        if( opt.batch && rc )
-           gpg_exit(1);
+           g10_exit(1);
     }
     else {
        char buf[50];
@@ -1157,12 +1830,12 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
                     sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
                     sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc );
        write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf );
-       if( rc == GPGERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
+       if( rc == G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) {
            buf[16] = 0;
            write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf );
        }
-       if( rc != GPGERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
-           log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_errstr(rc) );
+       if( rc != G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED )
+           log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), g10_errstr(rc) );
     }
     return rc;
 }
@@ -1180,7 +1853,18 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
     if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only )
        return;
 
-    c->local_id = 0;
+    /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase
+       they may be the root packet.  These packets are only used in
+       addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */
+    while ( node
+            && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+            && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                         == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) {
+        node = node->next;
+    }
+    if (!node)
+        return;
+
     c->trustletter = ' ';
     if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
        || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
@@ -1196,12 +1880,11 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
        if( !c->have_data ) {
            free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
            /* prepare to create all requested message digests */
-           if ( !(c->mfx.md = gcry_md_open(0, 0)) )
-               BUG();
+           c->mfx.md = md_open(0, 0);
 
            /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/
            for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) {
-               gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
+               md_enable( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
            }
            /* ask for file and hash it */
            if( c->sigs_only ) {
@@ -1211,20 +1894,64 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
            }
            else {
                rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
-                                               iobuf_get_fname(c->iobuf),
+                                               iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
                        n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 );
            }
            if( rc ) {
-               log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc));
+               log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
                return;
            }
        }
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
 
        for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
            check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
     }
+    else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
+             && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
+                == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) {
+        /* clear text signed message */
+       if( !c->have_data ) {
+            log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+       
+       for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); )
+           check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+    }
     else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
        PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
+       int multiple_ok=1;
+
+       n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
+       if(n1)
+         {
+           byte class=sig->sig_class;
+           byte hash=sig->digest_algo;
+
+           for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
+             {
+               /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
+                  different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
+                  to run a different hash context for each), but if
+                  they are all the same, make an exception. */
+               if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class
+                  || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash)
+                 {
+                   multiple_ok=0;
+                   log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected.  "
+                              "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
+                   break;
+                 }
+             }
+         }
 
        if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 )
            log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"),
@@ -1232,28 +1959,22 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
        else if( !c->have_data ) {
            /* detached signature */
            free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx );
-           c->mfx.md = gcry_md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
-           if ( !c->mfx.md )
-               BUG();
+           c->mfx.md = md_open(sig->digest_algo, 0);
            if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds )
                ;
-           else if( sig->digest_algo == GCRY_MD_MD5
+           else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5
                     && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) {
                /* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */
-               c->mfx.md2 = gcry_md_open( GCRY_MD_MD5, 0 );
-               if ( !c->mfx.md2 )
-                   BUG();
+               c->mfx.md2 = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 );
            }
-           else if( sig->digest_algo == GCRY_MD_SHA1
-                    && sig->pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_DSA
+           else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
+                    && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
                     && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) {
                /* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached
                 * signature has been created in textmode */
-               c->mfx.md2 = gcry_md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
-               if ( !c->mfx.md2 )
-                   BUG();
+               c->mfx.md2 = md_open( sig->digest_algo, 0 );
            }
-         #if 0 /* workaround disabled */
+#if 0 /* workaround disabled */
            /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug
             * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures;
             * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail
@@ -1262,7 +1983,12 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
             * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others)
             */
                    /*  c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */
-         #endif
+#endif
+            if ( DBG_HASHING ) {
+                md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+                if ( c->mfx.md2  )
+                    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" );
+            }
            if( c->sigs_only ) {
                rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
                                     c->signed_data, c->sigfilename,
@@ -1270,23 +1996,32 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
            }
            else {
                rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
-                                               iobuf_get_fname(c->iobuf),
+                                               iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
                                                (sig->sig_class == 0x01) );
            }
            if( rc ) {
-               log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_errstr(rc));
+               log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
                return;
            }
        }
-       else
+        else if ( c->signed_data ) {
+            log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") );
+            return;
+        }
+        else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' )
+            ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */
+       else if (!opt.quiet)
            log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
 
-       check_sig_and_print( c, node );
+       if(multiple_ok)
+         for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) )
+           check_sig_and_print( c, n1 );
+       else
+         check_sig_and_print( c, node );
     }
-    else
+    else {
+        dump_kbnode (c->list);
        log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"));
-
+        dump_kbnode (node);
+    }
 }
-
-
-